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ABSTRACT
The International Criminal Court (ICC) operates under a
regime of complementarity: a domestic state prosecution of a
defendant charged before the ICC bars the Court from hearing
the case unless the state is unable or unwilling to prosecute the
accused. For years, scholars have debated the role of due process
considerations in complementarity. Can a state that has failed
to provide the accused with adequate due process protections
nonetheless bar a parallel ICC prosecution? One popular view,
first expressed by Professor Kevin Jon Heller, holds that due
process considerations do not factor into complementarity and
the ICC could be forced to cede a case even to a state intent on
subjecting the accused to a show trial. Drawing on recent ICC
precedents, this Article argues that the Pre-Trial Chamber has
begun to resolve this open question. The Court is now developing
a system of "predictive due process." Under this new model of
due process, the Court considers to a limited extent whether
domestic criminal proceedings abide by international norms
and, as part of the analysis, the Court tries to predict how the
state in question would treat the accused if given control of the
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case. Taking a rational actor view of judicial behavior, this
Article concludes that the rise of predictive due process is
inevitable. From the perspective of ICC judges entrusted with
the Court's institutional legitimacy, some consideration of due
process factors is the optimal risk-averse strategy. Finally,
proceedingfrom the conclusion that the ICC inevitably will use
predictive due process, the Article argues that the ICC should
learn from other courts that engage in similar inquiries.
Specifically, the Court should seek guidance from the
International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia's
decision making under Article 11 bis, international economic
law jurisprudence on standards of review, and the
proportionality jurisprudence of international human rights
tribunals.Although reliance on human rights law conflicts with
stated ICC doctrine, this standard may give way in practice, if
not in form.
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I. INTRODUCTION

Imagine that the International Criminal Court (ICC) has
indicted a defendant from a small, developing country for war crimes
and crimes against humanity. After the accused is transferred to The
Hague, the state in which he committed his crimes nonetheless
indicts him. Now controlled by the defendant's rival ethnic group, the
state is intent on convicting and imprisoning the defendant.
Indications are that the state has no intention of providing the
accused with even minimal due process rights at his trial. Does the
ICC have to transfer the defendant back to his home state?
Though this situation may seem far-fetched, it is entirely
plausible through the doctrine of complementarity. In many
situations, complementarity requires the ICC to abandon a case once
a domestic prosecution has commenced. Whether the doctrine applies
when the would-be domestic prosecution appears to violate the
defendant's due process rights has remained an open question-or at
least it has until recently. Drawing on new precedents, this Article
identifies a new trend that may resolve such problems. Through the
emerging doctrine of "predictive due process," the ICC has signaled
its openness to account for certain, limited due process concerns when
evaluating complementarity-based challenges to its jurisdiction. It is
doing so by making predictive judgments about how the state would
treat the accused if allowed to proceed. The advent of this new model
of due process is one of the most significant recent developments in
the ICC's evolving relationship with the states parties of the Rome
Statute.
Complementarity is one of the cornerstones of the International
Criminal Court. Under the Rome Statute, which established and
regulates the functions of the ICC, a case is admissible only when the
state party of which the accused is a national is unable or unwilling
to prosecute.1 The result is that the ICC is a court of last resort that
is complementary to the jurisdiction of national courts. 2 This
innovation was critical in securing state support for the Rome
Statute,3 and today, in an era where many accuse the ICC of political

1.
See Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court July 17, 1998, 2187
U.N.T.S. 3, pmbl., art. 17 [hereinafter Rome Statute].
2.
See generally Linda E. Carter, The Future of the International Criminal
Court: Complementarity as a Strength or a Weakness?, 12 WASH. U. GLOBAL STUD. L.
REV. 451, 452-54 (2013) (providing an overview of the Rome Statute's complementarity
principle).
3.
See RoY S. K. LEE, THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT: THE MAKING OF
THE ROME STATUTE 41-78 (1999) (explaining that a system based on national
procedures complemented by an international court was clearly viewed by states as the
most effective and viable system).
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motivated prosecution, 4 it is an important tool for bolstering the
Court's legitimacy. 5 Complementarity is also more than a legal
principle. Over the past ten years, state primacy has become one of
the guiding lights for the Office of the Prosecutor of the ICC. Former
Prosecutor Luis Moreno-Ocampo himself has often emphasized that a
sign of the ICC's ultimate success would be that the Court has no
cases because all possible cases are being prosecuted in domestic
courts. 6
The Rome Statue does little to define complementarity's
contours. Article 17 of the Statute, which lays out complementarity,
provides only a few paragraphs of information. Among the questions
the Rome Statute leaves open are, whom and what exactly must the
domestic state be investigating in order to render the corresponding
ICC case inadmissible? And when, legally, is a state "unwilling" or
"unable" to prosecute? Over the past ten years, these questions and
others have emerged as flashpoints, as litigants have challenged the
permissibility of cases brought in the ICC on complementarity
grounds, arguing that state efforts to investigate and prosecute
should abrogate ICC investigations and indictments. The result has
been a series of decisions that have resolved many of the outstanding
questions about complementarity. For example, it is now clear that a
state investigation may only render an ICC case inadmissible if the
state is investigating the same person for "substantially the same
conduct as" is the Prosecutor of the ICC.7

4.
See, e.g., Michael Birnbaum, African Leaders Complain of Bias at the ICC
as Kenya Trials Get Underway, WASH. POST (Dec. 5, 2013), http://www.washingtonpost
.com/worldleurope/african-leaders-complain-of-bias-at-icc-as-kenya-trials-are-underway/
2013/12/05/Oc52fe7a-56cb-11e3-bdbf-097ab2a3dc2bstory.html
[http://perma.cc/6AX4-GBXS]
(archived Jan. 19, 2015) ("There are eight cases and 21 defendants in front of the
International Criminal Court, and every last one of them is from Africa.. . . [The ICC's]
choice of cases has frustrated African leaders, who say that comparable crimes
elsewhere in the world are being ignored and that race is a factor in the decisionmaking."); Mwangi S. Kimenyi, Can the International Criminal Court Play Fair in
Africa?, BROOKINGS: AFRICA IN Focus (Oct. 17, 2013, 11:15 AM), http://www.brookings
.edulblogs/africa-in-focus/posts/2013/10/17-africa-international-criminal-court-kimenyi
[http://perma.cc/6V4T-VU4E] (archived Jan. 19, 2015) (discussing criticisms of the ICC
expressed by African nations and concluding that "claims of unfair adjudication of
justice may not be far-fetched").
See Michael A. Newton, The Complementarity Conundrum: Are We
5.
Watching Evolution or Evisceration?, 8 SANTA CLARA J. INT'L L. 115, 119-23 (2010)
("The long term viability of the International Criminal Court ... depends upon an
implementation of the complementarity principle that preserves cooperative synergy
between the Court and domestic jurisdictions.").
See OFFICE OF THE PROSECUTOR, PAPER ON SOME POLICY ISSUES BEFORE
6.
THE OFFICE OF THE PROSECUTOR 4 (2003) [hereinafter OTP PAPER], http://www.icecpi.intinr/rdonlyres/fa7c4c6-de5f-42b7-8b25-60aa962ed8b6/143594/030905-policy-paper.pdf
[http://perma.cc/JF7P-HQ7Z] (archived Jan. 19, 2015).
7.
Prosecutor v. Muthaura, Kenyatta & Ali, Case No. ICC-01/09-02/11-274,
Judgment on Appeal, T 39 (Aug. 30, 2011) [hereinafter Muthaura Judgment on
Appeal], http://www.icc-cpi.int/iccdocs/doc/docl223134.pdf
[http://perma.cc/GM8HC8VR] (archived Jan. 19, 2015); see also Charles Chernor Jalloh, International
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Today, one of the last remaining areas of ambiguity regarding
complementarity is the role of due process considerations in the
Court's legal analysis. Article 17 of the Rome Statute was written
primarily to ensure that the ICC would retain the ability to hear a
case when a domestic state was intent on protecting the accused by
engaging in a sham investigation or prosecution. 8 But what about the
inverse problem? What if a state is overzealous and wants to or
cannot help but to subject the accused to an investigation and
prosecution that is unconstrained by international norms of due
process? In the worst-case scenario, what if the state intends to
subject the accused to a show trial? Would the ICC retain the ability
to hear a case in such circumstances? 9 In the early years of the ICC,
most scholars subscribed to the so-called due process thesis, which
contends that under Article 17 a state prosecution that does not abide
by international due process norms cannot trigger complementarity.' 0
However, in an influential 2006 article, Professor Kevin Jon Heller
made a compelling case for the opposite conclusion-that Article 17
does not allow for due process considerations and that a show trial
actually could render an ICC case inadmissible." Since that time,
academics have debated without resolution whether and how much of
a role due process norms should have in complementarity analysis.12
Decisions: Situation in the Republic of Kenya, 106 AM. J. INT'L L. 118, 120 (2012)
(quoting Muthaura Judgment on Appeal, supra) ("[Flor a judicial determination of
inadmissibility. . . 'the national investigation must cover the same individual and
substantially the same conduct as alleged in the proceedings before the Court."').
8 See Beth Van Schaack, ICC Case Against Spy Chief Senussi Deemed
Inadmissible, JUST SECURITY (Oct. 14, 2013, 2:48 PM), http://justsecurity.org/2013/10/
14/icc-case-spy-chief-senussi-deemed-inadmissible/ [http://perma.ccY8CK-CLTX] (archived
Jan. 19, 2015).
9 This question is closely related to whether due process considerations can factor
into whether a state is "unable" to prosecute a case, a consideration accounted for by
Article 17. See Rome Statute, supra note 1, art. 17.
10 See, e.g., Mark S. Ellis, The InternationalCriminal Court and Its Implication for
Domestic Law and National Capacity Building, 15 FLA. J. INT'L L. 215, 226 (2002)
("[F]or states who become party to the Statute and who have not embraced these
standards [of due process recognized by international law], the ICC will require them
to ensure the basic rights for the accused."); Jann K. Kleffner, The Impact of
Complementarity on National Implementation of Substantive International Criminal
Law, 1 J. INT'L CRIM. JUST. 86, 112 (2003) (assessing the "significant impact of
complementarity on the implementation of substantive international criminal law" and
arguing that pursuant to the principle of complementarity, states must "pay due
consideration to . . . the rights of due process").
11.
See Kevin Jon Heller, The Shadow Side of Complementarity: The Effect of
Article 17 of the Rome Statute on National Due Process, 17 CRIM. L.F. 255, 257 (2006).
It is worth noting that Heller later modified his position on Article 17. He now contends
that the proper interpretation of the second limb of complementarity is that due
process concerns are relevant only insofar as they are tied to the challenging state's
norms of due process. See infra note 43.
See generally Gregory S. McNeal, Lessons from the Saddam Trial: ICC
12.
Inability DeterminationsIn Light of the Dujail Case, 39 CASE. W. RES. J. INT'L L. 325
(2006) (discussing the "due process thesis" and textualist approaches to inability
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In the last two years, the ICC has issued several decisions on
complementarity that have the potential to advance the debate over
due process. Each of the decisions stemmed from the ICC's
involvement in Libya. In 2011, pursuant to a UN Security Council
referral, the Prosecutor of the ICC sought warrants for the arrest of
Saif Al-Islam Gaddafi, the son of Muammar Gaddafi, and Abdullah
Al-Senussi, Libya's widely-feared former chief of intelligence.13 Both
stand accused of crimes against humanity stemming from their
participation in the atrocities perpetrated by the Gaddafi regime.14
But after Libyan rebels, assisted by an international air campaign,
overthrew the Gaddafi regime, the new Libyan government insisted
that Libya would itself prosecute Gaddafi and Senussi. Litigation
over complementarity at the ICC ensued. Ultimately, the ICC issued
decisions addressing Libya's complementarity challenges in each of
the case. The Pre Trial Chamber, and later the Appeals Chamber,
held that the international case against Gaddafi remained admissible
but found the ICC case against Senussi was inadmissible under
Article 17. In the process, the Court discussed extensively the role of
due process concerns in complementarity.
Drawing on these decisions and others, this Article concludes
that the ICC is beginning to move toward a new model of due process
jurisprudence. In contrast with many of the recent examinations of
complementarity, this Article concludes that the ICC remains open to
considering the due
process
implications
of granting
a
complementarity challenge. However, increasingly, the ICC Pre-Trial
Chamber is engaging in "predictive" due process analysis-it
examines the behavior of the state challenging complementarity and,
based on the evidence before it, makes predictions about whether the
state will be willing and able to abide by certain due process norms in
its future investigation and prosecution of the accused. As part of this
predictive jurisprudence, the Court is open to conducting a
reasonably invasive look at the behavior of the state in question.
Though the Court's analysis is not explicitly guided by international
due process norms, the Court's discussion in both Libya cases shows
that it will consider those norms in numerous circumstances.
determinations); Jennifer Trahan, Is Complementarity the Right Approach for the
International Criminal Court's Crime of Aggression? Considering the Problem of
"Overzealous" National Court Prosecutions, 45 CORNELL INT'L L.J. 569 (2012)
(assessing "whether there are ways to interpret the current complementarity provision
broadly enough to cover the problem of 'all too willing' domestic court prosecutions that
fail to adhere to due process"); Anna Bishop, Note, Failure of Complementarity: The
Future of the International Criminal Court Following the Libyan Admissibility
Challenge, 22 MINN. J. INT'L L. 388 (2013).
13.
See Situation in the Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, Case No. ICC-01/11,
Prosecutor's Application Pursuant to Article 57 as to Muammar Mohammed Abu
Minyar Gaddafi, Saif Al-Islam Gaddafi, and Abdullah Al-Senussi (May 16, 2011),
http://www.icc-cpi.int/iccdocs/doc/docl073503.pdf [http://perma.cc/V5UB-9NPJ] (archived
Jan. 19, 2015).
14.
See id. ¶ 3.
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Although this style of complementarity jurisprudence conflicts
with established ICC doctrine on the first "limb" of the Article 17
admissibility test, the Court's turn to predictive analysis in
addressing whether a state is unwilling or unable to prosecute is
likely inevitable. Taking a rational actor view of judicial behavior,
which treats ICC judges as autonomous actors with their own
preferences and goals, this Article argues that when assessing
whether a state is "unable or unwilling" to prosecute the accused, ICC
judges will engage in predictive analysis guided by due process
standards because doing so offers the best chance at maintaining the
ICC's legitimacy among key states parties. In so doing, this Article
goes beyond the doctrinal question about the meaning of Article 17
that has defined the due process debate in the academic literature.
Instead of merely asking what the meaning of complementarity is,
this Article defines the core question as, what meaning are ICC
judges likely to ascribe to complementarity, given both legal and
extra-legal factors?
Accepting that the ICC is adopting a predictive complementarity
analysis that incorporates limited due process norms, this Article
proceeds to show that the ICC can learn lessons from other
international and domestic courts that have addressed similar issues.
A variety of courts regularly assess the motives and capacities of
other court systems, and many perform predictive analysis of how
other court systems will perform in the future. These courts have
developed techniques and heuristics to increase the accuracy of their
determinations. In particular, the ICC should look to 11 bis
determinations made by the ICTY, determinations related to
exhaustion and the Convention Against Torture made by domestic
courts, and to the jurisprudence of the European Court of Human
Rights and other international human rights tribunals. The aim of
this Article is not to offer a full account of what the ICC can learn
from such institutions but rather to show demonstratively how the
ICC stands to benefit from drawing on the experience of other
national and international courts in the complementarity realm.
The remainder of the Article proceeds in four parts. Part II
provides a brief history of complementarity, focusing on the
development of the due process thesis. Part III, the heart of the
Article, charts the recent development of predictive due process. After
summarizing the content of the Libya decisions, Part III shows how
the decisions portend the adoption of predictive due process. It then
demonstrates how this development is inevitable. Part IV offers
lessons from other legal systems that the ICC can apply to its
complementarity jurisprudence. In particular, the ICC should
consider establishing a special panel to hear complementarity
challenges and incorporating the concepts of variable standards of
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review and proportionality into its Article 17 jurisprudence. Part V
concludes.

II. HISTORY AND DOCTRINE OF COMPLEMENTARITY

The way in which the ICC gains jurisdiction and admits cases is
the product of a long and contentious negotiating process. The result
of that process is a series of procedures that seek to balance the Rome
Statute's core goal of ending impunity with respect for the
sovereignty of states parties.1 5 The ICC may only exercise jurisdiction
over crimes specified in the Rome Statute1 6 in three situations: (1)
when a state party to the Rome Statute refers a situation to the ICC
Prosecutor, (2) when the Security Council refers a case to the
Prosecutor under Chapter VII of the UN Charter, and (3) when the
Prosecutor initiates an investigation of a situation proprio motu
under Article 15 of the Rome Statute.17 However, even if the ICC has
established jurisdiction over a particular situation, a case arising
from that situation must be "admissible" in order for it to proceed. It
is at this admissibility stage where the Rome Statute's drafters made
perhaps their most significant concession to state sovereignty.
Previous international tribunals enjoyed "primacy" over domestic
courts, meaning that if the ICTY and a domestic court both indicted
the same individual, the ICTY retained the power to hear the case
and the domestic court was obligated to defer to the ICTY.1 8 The
drafters of the Rome Statute took a different approach. Several

15.
See generally LEE, supra note 3 (discussing the principle of
complementarity); Philippe Kirsch & John T. Holmes, Developments in International
Criminal Law: The Rome Conference on an International Criminal Court: The
NegotiatingProcess, 93 AM. J. INT'L L. 2 (1999) (discussing the primary issues under
consideration and the "evolution of negotiations" at the Rome Conference).
See Rome Statute, supra note 1, art. 5.
16.
17.
See id. arts. 13, 15; see also Bishop, supra note 12, at 391-92.
18.
See S.C. Res. 827, Annex, art. 9(2), U.N. Doc. S/RES/827 (May 25, 1993)
("The International Tribunal shall have primacy over national courts."); see also
Prosecutor v. Tadid, Case No. IT-94-1-I, Decision on the Defence Motion for
Interlocutory Appeal on Jurisdiction, ¶¶ 49-64 (Int'l Crim. Trib. for the Former
Yugoslavia Oct. 2, 1995) (confirming the legitimacy of the primacy principle). Around
the time the ICTY was created, many commentators agreed that a primacy system was
critical for the success of international criminal tribunals, as it vindicated international
criminal law as truly "transnational," and made sense given the extraordinary gravity
of the crimes being prosecuted. See Bartram S. Brown, Primacy or Complementarity:
Reconciling the Jurisdictionof National Courts and InternationalCriminal Tribunals,
23 YALE J. INT'L L. 383, 394-95 (1998) ("This extraordinary jurisdictional priority is
justified by the compelling international humanitarian interests involved and by the
Security Council's determination that the situation in the former Yugoslavia, as well as
that in Rwanda, constituted a threat to international peace and security."); Kerry R.
Wortzel, The Jurisdiction of An InternationalCriminal Tribunal in Kosovo, 11 PACE
INT'L L. REV. 379, 390-91 (1999) (justifying primacy through reference to principles of
universal jurisdiction).
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factors pushed the drafting parties away from primacy. Most notably,
there was a fear among some states parties that a court with the
potentially massive jurisdictional reach of the ICC would be too
powerful if given primacy over domestic courts.19 Rome Conference
delegates feared creating an "international appellate court" that could
second-guess the outcomes of domestic criminal proceedings. 2 0 There
was also a sense among delegates that it was normatively preferable
for prosecutions to take place in domestic courts, where possible. The
result of these and other concerns was that the Rome Statute adopted
a regime of complementarity. As explained in the preamble of the
Statute, the ICC is intended to be "complementary" to national
courts, functioning as a court of last resort. 2 ' In practical terms,
complementarity means that an ICC investigation or case generally is
not admissible if the case is being investigated or prosecuted at the
national level. This standard was intended to balance the universalist
goals of international criminal justice with traditional conceptions of
sovereignty and to provide states where atrocities occur with an
incentive to investigate and prosecute perpetrators.22
The legal regime enforcing complementarity is contained in
Article 17(1) of the Rome Statute, which governs the circumstances in
which an ICC case may be found inadmissible. Article 17(1) starts
with the assumption that cases before the Court are admissible; a
case will be found inadmissible only when one of four criteria is
satisfied:
(a) The case is being investigated or prosecuted by a State that has
jurisdiction over it, unless the State is unwilling or unable genuinely to
carry out the investigation or prosecution;
(b) The case has been investigated by a State which has jurisdiction
over it and the State has decided not to prosecute the person concerned,
unless the decision resulted from the unwillingness or inability of the
State genuinely to prosecute;

19.
See Mohamed M. El Zeidy, The Principle of Complementarity: A New
Machinery to Implement InternationalCriminal Law, 23 MICH. J. INT'L L. 869, 890-97
(2002) (describing motivations of states parties in the Rome Statute drafting process);
see also Michael A. Newton, Comparative Complementarity: Domestic Jurisdiction
Consistent with the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, 167 MIL. L.
REV. 20, 27 (2001) ("The complementarity principle is ... the critical node in
ascertaining whether the ICC will trample on the sovereign prerogatives of states, or
will coexist in a constructive and beneficial relationship with all nations.").
20.
This fear was particularly salient to the delegation from the United States,
because of the U.S.'s large military commitments outside its borders. See David J.
Scheffer, Staying the Course with the International Criminal Court, 35 CORNELL INT'L
L.J. 47, 86-87 (2002).
21.
Rome Statute, supra note 1, pmbl.
22.
See El Zeidy, supra note 19 (discussing the development of the principle of
complementarity in the drafting of the Rome Statute).
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(c) The person concerned has already been tried for conduct which is
the subject of the complaint, and a trial by the Court is not permitted
under article 20, paragraph 3;
(d) The case is not of sufficient gravity to justify further action by the
Court. 2 3

The collective effect of these four criteria is to set up a system of
complementary but arguably competitive jurisdictions. Once a case
has been brought before the ICC, a litigant may challenge the Court's
ability to hear the case either by arguing that national proceedings
render it inadmissible or that the ICC cannot proceed because the
case is of insufficient gravity.24 Since the Rome Statute went into
effect in 2004, a substantial body of jurisprudence has developed
regarding each of the provisions of Article 17(1). However, for the
purposes of this Article, the most important parts of the provision are
17(l)(a), which governs situations in which a state is investigating or
prosecuting the case before the ICC, and 17(l)(b), which governs
situations in which a state previously investigated the case before the
ICC, but decided not to prosecute.

The ICC's first decision 2 5 implicating Article 17(1) came in 2009
in Prosecutor v. Kony,26 in which the Pre-Trial Chamber established
firmly that the question of complementarity is to be adjudicated by
the ICC, not by states parties, and confirmed the Court's ability to
examine admissibility using its propriu motu powers without a
motion by a litigant. 27 Shortly thereafter, the Appeals Chamber
decided
Prosecutor v.
Katanga &
Ngudjolo,2 8
the
first

23.
Rome Statute, supra note 1, art. 17(1).
24.
See id. art. 19.
25.
Much of the early litigation under these provisions centered on the question
of whether a case before the ICC was admissible if domestic authorities declined to
prosecute a case in anticipation of ICC action. See, e.g., Thomas Obel Hansen, A
Critical Review of the ICC's Recent Practice ConcerningAdmissibility Challenges and
Complementarity, 13 MELB. J. INT'L L. 217, 218 & n.4 (2012), available at http://
papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract id=2046077&download=yes [http://perma.cc/
4RB8-HY4R] (archived May 18, 2015) (referencing such litigation).
26.
Prosecutor v. Kony, Otti, Odhiambo & Ongwen, Case No. ICC-02/04-01/05,
Decision on the Admissibility of the Case Under Article 19(1) of the Statute (Mar. 10,
2009) [hereinafter Kony Decision on Admissibility].
27.
See id. $1 14, 45, 51. The Court in Kony ultimately concluded sun sponte
that the Annexure to the Agreement on Accountability and Reconciliation signed
between the Government of the Republic of Uganda and the Lord's Resistance
Army/Movement did not render the ICC case inadmissible because the case was not
being "investigated or prosecuted" by Ugandan authorities under the meaning of
Article 17(a)(1). See id. ¶¶ 2, 7, 47, 51-52.
28.
Case No. ICC-01/04-01/07 OA 8, Judgment on the Appeal of Mr. Germain
Katanga Against the Oral Decision of Trial Chamber II of 12 June 2009 on the
Admissibility of the Case (Sept. 25, 2009) [hereinafter Katanga Judgment on Appeal].
In 2007, Congolese authorities surrendered to the ICC Germain Katanga, a former
leader of the Patriotic Resistance Force in Ituri (FRPI) who had been indicted by the
ICC for war crimes and crimes against humanity. See Press Release, International
Criminal Court, Office of the Prosecutor, Statement of Deputy Prosecutor Fatou
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complementarity challenge brought by a defendant. 29 In that case,3 0
the Court clarified that an inquiry under Article 17(1)(a) (and, by
analogy, 17(1)(b)) consists of two steps. First, the Court must ask if
domestic authorities are investigating or prosecuting the case against
the defendant. If they are not, then the ICC case is admissible and
the analysis need go no further. If-and only if-domestic authorities
are investigating or prosecuting the case, then the Court will proceed
to the second step and ask whether the state is unable or unwilling
genuinely to carry out the investigation or prosecution. 3 ' In 2011,
approximately two years after Katanga, the Appeals Chamber further
clarified the structure of the 17(1)(a) inquiry in Prosecutor v.
Muthaura. In that case, which stemmed from Kenya's 2007 election
violence, the Appeals Chamber confirmed that the first component of
the complementarity test is satisfied only if the domestic
investigation/case is investigating the "same individual" and

Bensouda to the Media Regarding the Surrender of Germain Katanga (Oct. 19, 2007),
http://www.ice-cpi.intINR/rdonlyres/21DF3DC-B184-4019-8CAB-31C6ECE3DBFl/2772841
ICCOTPSTFB200710197.pdf [https://perma.cc/26RA-SP68] (archived Feb. 1, 2015).
Katanga subsequently challenged the admissibility of his case on a variety of
complementarity-related grounds, among them that Congolese authorities had been
investigating the conduct that formed the basis of the ICC indictment (thus rendering
the case inadmissible under 17(a)(1)), see Prosecutor v. Katanga & Ngudjolo, Case No.
ICC-01/04-01/07, Motion Challenging the Admissibility of the Case by the Defence of
Germain Katanga, Pursuant to Article 19(2)(a) of the Statute, ¶¶ 50-52 (Mar. 11,
2009), http://www.icc-cpi.int/iccdocs/doc/doc642392.pdf [https://perma.cc/5QSH-MSMR]
(archived Feb. 1, 2015), and that the Congo's act of surrendering him to the ICC
constituted a decision "not to prosecute" under Article 17(1)(b). See Prosecutor v.
Katanga & Ngudjolo, Case No. ICC-01/04-01/07-1015, Defence Reply to Prosecution
Response to Motion Challenging the Admissibility of the Case by the Defence of
Germain Katanga, Pursuant to Article 19(2)(a), 1 9-10 (Apr. 1, 2009), http://www.icccpi.int/iccdocs/doc/doc656348.pdf [https://perma.cc/C2KS-7VBC] (archived Feb. 1,
2015).
29.
See Ben Batros, The Evolution of the ICC Jurisprudence on
Complementarity, in THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT AND COMPLEMENTARITY:

FROM THEORY TO PRACTICE 558, 564 (Carsten Stahn & Mohamed M. El Zeidy eds.,
2011).

30.
See Katanga Judgment on Appeal, supra note 28. The Pre-Trial Chamber
rejected Katanga's arguments and held the case admissible, and Katanga exercised his
right of appeal to the Appeals Chamber. See id.
31.
See id. ¶¶ 74-79. Applying this reading of the statute to Katanga's case, the
Appeals Chamber found that because Congolese authorities declined to pursue
Katanga's case in anticipation of the ICC prosecution, the case had not been
"investigated or prosecuted" under the meaning of 17(1)(a). See id. $ 80; see also
Batros, supra note 29, at 567-68. Thus, the Appeals Chamber determined that the case
was admissible without considering the second part of the 17(1)(a) test. See Batros,
supra note 29, at 568 ("[T]he Appeals Chamber did not examine the 'second form of
unwillingness' that the Trial Chamber had relied upon. Rather, it shifted the focus of
admissibility assessments squarely back to whether the state is taking any action.").
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"substantially the same conduct" as the ICC case3 2 and applied that
standard to find the ICC's investigation in Kenya admissible.3 3
One outcome of these early complementarity cases was that
Article 17(1) (both (a) and (b)) became bifurcated. The first so-called
arm of the Article 17 inquiry-whether the country at issue was
actually investigating or prosecuting the accused-became a
threshold test for the Court to evaluate at the outset of a
complementarity challenge. The second arm-whether the country
was unable or unwilling to investigate or prosecute-is only relevant
when the country has proven it satisfies the first arm's requirements.
Because until recently all complementarity challenges have been
resolved under the first "limb" of the Article 17(1)(a) test (whether
there is an investigation or prosecution), the law of the second limb of
the test remains underdeveloped. Prior to the Libya decisions, most of
what was known definitively about the second arm came in the form
of asides from earlier decisions focused on other aspects of
complementarity. For example, the Appeals Chamber in Katanga, as
well as in Prosecutorv. Bemba, confirmed that the second part of the
test is disjunctive: the ICC may maintain jurisdiction either if the
state is "unable genuinely" or "unwilling genuinely" to investigate or
prosecute. 34 However, many other questions remain unsettled. First,
the meanings of both "unable" and "unwilling" remain subjects of
debate. The "unable" category appears to have been meant to deal
primarily with situations in which the national government cannot
proceed due to systemic collapse of judicial infrastructure, as might
be expected in many of war-torn states where the ICC investigates. 35
However, the extent to which capacity must be impaired to trigger
the inability provision remains ambiguous.
The Rome Statute provides more clues as to the meaning of
"unwilling." Article 17(2) provides, in full:
2. In order to determine unwillingness in a particular case, the Court
shall consider, having regard to the principles of due process recognized

32.
Muthaura Judgment on Appeal, supra note 7, ¶ 1.
33.
See id. ¶ 123. Kenya's investigation, the Appeals Chamber found, was not
sufficiently advanced or targeted at the same individuals or conduct to render the ICC
case inadmissible. Id.
34.
See Prosecutor v. Jean-Pierre Bemba Gombo, Case No. ICC-01/05-01/09,
Judgment on the Appeal of Mr Jean-Pierre Bemba Gombo Against the Decision of Trial
Chamber III of 24 June 2010 Entitled "Decision on the Admissibility and Abuse of
Process Challenges", T 107 (Oct. 19, 2010) (referring to "the unwillingness or inability
of the State genuinely to prosecute"); Katanga Judgment on Appeal, supra note 28,
1 78 (explaining that the second prong of the test is unnecessary if the first prong is
satisfied).
35.
See Jessica Almqvist, Complementarity and Human Rights: A Litmus Test
for the International Criminal Court, 30 LoY. L.A. INT'L & COMP. L. REV. 335, 338
(2008) (citation omitted) ("In determining state inability in a particular case, the Court
shall consider whether, due to a total or substantial collapse or unavailability of its
national judicial system, the state is unable to 'obtain the accused or the necessary
evidence and testimony or otherwise unable to carry out its proceedings."').
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by international law, whether one or more of the following exist, as
applicable:
(a) The proceedings were or are being undertaken or the national
decision was made for the purpose of shielding the person concerned
from criminal responsibility for crimes within the jurisdiction of the
Court referred to in article 5;
(b) There has been an unjustified delay in the proceedings which in
the circumstances is inconsistent with an intent to bring the person
concerned to justice;
(c) The proceedings were not or are not being conducted
independently or impartially, and they were or are being conducted in
a manner which, in the circumstances, is inconsistent with an intent
36
to bring the person concerned to justice.

Though this additional text focuses the unwilling inquiry, it, too,
leaves open questions. First, what is the meaning of the Statute's
reference to "principles of due process recognized by international
law"? Second, is unwillingness defined exclusively by the specific
circumstances enumerated in 17(2)(a)-(c), or are those circumstances
merely examples of situations where unwillingness would be found?
And finally, what is the meaning of "bring[ing] the person concerned
to justice" in 17(2)(c)? 3 7
These questions became crucial in the debate with which this
Article most directly engages: whether the ICC can hear a case under
the second arm of Article 17 when the domestic investigation or
prosecution of the accused presents due process concerns. As other
commenters have noted,3 8 this question sits uncomfortably within the
framework of the Rome Statute. When the Rome Conference
delegates crafted the Article 17 exceptions to complementarity, their
primary concern was that states would use the complementarity
regime to shield ICC indictees from justice. The possibility of
complementarity being used to facilitate show trials or victor's justice
was less salient. 39 One school of thought on this issue, which has been
termed the "due process thesis," leans heavily on the Statute's
reference to "principles of due process recognized by international
law" to conclude that a state that fails to abide by international due
process norms in its investigation or prosecution is "unwilling" to
investigate or prosecute under the meaning of the Statute. 40

36.
Rome Statute, supra note 1, art. 17(2).
37.
Id.
38.
See Van Schaack, supra note 8 ("The statutory framework does not easily
apply to an over-zealous national system.").
39.
See id. (noting that complementarity was designed to deal with situations
in which authorities are shielding the accused or the system has collapsed).
40.
See Ellis, supra note 10 (discussing the "due process theory"); see also Dawn
Yamane Hewett, Recent Development, Sudan's Courts and Complementarity in the
Face of Darfur, 31 YALE J. INT'L L. 265, 276 (2006) (arguing that the ICC should
consider due process concerns in evaluating complementarity in the Darfur context);
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Additionally, according to many proponents of the due process thesis,
a proceeding that does not comport with due process norms would be
inconsistent with an intent to "bring the person concerned to justice"
because the term "bring to justice" arguably implies punishment after
a fair criminal trial. However, an alternative view, which was first
explored by Professor Kevin Jon Heller and latter elaborated by other
scholars, 41 contends that there are no due process safeguards in
Article 17. The core of Heller's argument was that the Article 17(2)(c)
exception applies only if the state's intent is other than bringing the
person concerned to justice, and that the term "bring . . . to justice" is
"synonymous with the intent to obtain a conviction in both ordinary
ICC parlance and in international law generally." 42 The details of this
debate are too voluminous to fully explore here, so it will suffice to
say that the due process question has no clear answer.
Regardless of which thesis one finds persuasive, the due process
debate raises profound questions about the proper role of the ICC and
states parties in international criminal justice. If one accepts the
original Heller thesis-that due process violations in national
proceedings are simply irrelevant-then one is left with the potential
for outrageous situations that might threaten the legitimacy of
international criminal law. Could the ICC be forced to cede a case to a
state that makes abundantly clear it plans to subject the accused to a
show trial? Such an outcome would seem difficult to stomach,
particularly for the pro-human rights governments and NGOs that
have supported the ICC since its inception. 43 Yet accepting the full
due process thesis would place the ICC in an awkward position. The
ICC is not a human rights court and is perhaps ill equipped to
consistently make determinations about the capacity of domestic
judicial institutions. Placing the ICC in this role could also exacerbate
tensions between states parties and the Court. Even the "middle
ground" options between the due process thesis and the Heller thesis
present problems. For example, Heller's more recent suggestion, that
due process should be relevant to complementarity insofar as a state

&

Carsten Stahn, Complementarity: A Tale of Two Notions, 19 CRIM. L.F. 87, 97 (2008);
Carsten Stahn, Libya, the International Criminal Court and Complementarity, 10 J.
INT'L CRIM. JUST. 325, 344-45 (2012) (arguing that the ICC should take account of due
process concerns when considering admissibility in the Libya cases).
41.
See Heller, supra note 11 (arguing that the due process thesis is incorrect);
see also Elinor Fry, Between Show Trials and Sham Prosecutions: The Rome Statute's
Potential Effect on Domestic Due Process Protections, 23 CRIM. L.F. 35, 44-50 (2012)
(arguing in favor of a modified form of the Heller argument, which would permit
consideration of only a limited amount of due process concerns); Fr6ddric Migret
Marika Giles Samson, Holding the Line on Complementarity in Libya: The Case for
Tolerating Flawed Domestic Trials, 11 J. INT'L CRIM. JUST. 571, 573-74 (2013).
Heller, supra note 11, at 261.
42.
43.
See Almqvist, supra note 34, at 354-56 (cataloging problems with the
permissive approach toward domestic trials with respect to due process).
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is not abiding by its own principles of due process,4 4 would give states
a pernicious incentive to create loopholes in its domestic due process
rules for prosecutions of international law crimes. Similarly, a
number of commentators have suggested that due process should
enter into the complementarity analysis only when the alleged
violations are particularly severe: for example, when the domestic
proceeding is "flawed beyond recognition." 45 Though the impulse
behind such arguments seems logical, the question remains how to
distinguish between severe and non-severe violations in a manner
consistent with the Rome Statute and customary international law.

III. LIBYA AND THE EMERGENCE OF PREDICTIVE DUE PROCESS

Perhaps the most significant development to date in the debate
over complementarity and due process has occurred over the last two
years, during which the Court has decided two cases under Article 17:
Libya's challenges to the ICC cases against Saif Al-Islam Gaddafi and
Abdullah Al-Senussi. This Part analyzes the impact of these cases on
the due process question and concludes that the ICC is moving
toward a limited version of the due process thesis and that this shift
has necessitated predictive analysis of the behavior of states
challenging complementarity. There are three subparts. Subpart A
provides a brief introduction to the background behind the ICC's
Libya cases and summarizes the Court's recent holdings. Subpart B
demonstrates that the Court is open to considering limited due
process norms through predictive analysis by assessing the text and
structure of the Gaddafi and Senussi opinions in the context of
existing ICC jurisprudence. Finally, subpart C employs a rational
actor conception of judicial behavior to show that some consideration
of due process factors by the ICC is likely inevitable.

44.
See Kevin Jon Heller, Why the Failure to Provide Saif with Due Process Is
Relevant to Libya's Admissibility Challenge, OPINIO JURIS (Aug. 2, 2012, 10:01 PM),
http://opiniojuris.org/2012/08/02/why-the-failure-to-provide-saif-with-due-process-is-relevantto-libyas-admissibility-challengel [http://perma.cc/TA7S-NRMN] (archived Jan. 19, 2015)
("[Libya's] failure [to live up to international standards] is irrelevant .... But [the]
Libyan government's failure to live up to the standards of its own criminal-justice
system is exceptionally relevant.").
45.
Jonathan O'Donohue & Sophie Rigney, The ICC Must Consider Fair Trial
Concerns in Determining Libya's Application to Prosecute Saif al-Islam Gaddafi
Nationally, EJIL: TALK! (June 8, 2012), http://www.ejiltalk.org/the-icc-must-considerfair-trial-concerns-in-determining-libyas-application-to-prosecute-saif-al-islam-gaddafinationally/#more-5011 [http://perma.cc/8G9Q-3N3D] (archived Jan. 19, 2015); see also
Fry, supra note 41 (discussing the "moderate" due process thesis); M6gret & Samson,
supra note 41, at 586 (describing cases that might be characterized as "'flawed beyond
recognition').
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A. Summary of the Libya Decisions
The ICC's involvement in Libya began on February 26, 2011.46
Earlier that month, Libyan leader Colonel Muammar Gaddafi had
responded to protests to his rule by violently repressing
demonstrators. 47 After the violence escalated and the Gaddafi regime
deployed warplanes and attack helicopters against protestors, the UN
Security Council met and instituted a package of measures designed
to isolate Gaddafi, including an arms embargo, travel bans, and
referral of the Libya situation to the ICC. 48 The Office of the
Prosecutor (OTP) acted quickly and, on March 3, 2011, opened a
formal investigation into the Libya situation. The United States and
EU states subsequently intensified pressure on the Gaddafi regime 4 9
and about two weeks later initiated a military campaign in support of
Libyan insurgents.5 0 On June 27, 2011, the ICC Pre-Trial Chamber
approved arrest warrants for three individuals: Muammar Gaddafi,
his son Saif Al-Islam Gaddafi, and Libyan intelligence chief Abdullah
Al-Senussi.5 1 The war in Libya effectively ended in late August 2011
when the rebels captured Tripoli.5 2 About two months later,
Muammar Gaddafi was captured and killed by an enraged mob. 5 3

46.
See Security Council Imposes Sanctions on Libyan Authorities in Bid to
Stem Violent Repression, UN NEWS CENTRE (Feb. 26, 2011), http://www.un.org/apps/
news/story.asp?NewslD=37633&Cr=Libya&Crl=#.Uyh8evdWSo [http://perma.ccfNR7VMSF3] (archived Jan. 19, 2015).
47.
See J. David Goodman, Battle Lines Harden Across the Mideast as Rules
Dig In, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 18, 2011), http://www.nytimes.com/2011/02/19/world/
middleeast/19protests.html?_r=0 [http://perma.cc/AHN3-6UD4] (archived Jan. 19, 2015)
(discussing attacks on protestors in Libya, Bahrain, and Yemen).
48.
See Anna F. Triponel & Paul R. Williams, Clash of the Titans: Justice and
Realpolitik in Libya, 28 AM. U. INT'L L. REV. 775, 799-800 (2013).
49.
See id. at 814-16.
50.
See David D. Kirkpatrick, Steven Erlanger & Elisabeth Bumiller, Allies
Open Air Assault on Qaddafi's Forces in Libya, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 19, 2011),
http://www.nytimes.com/20ll/03/20/world/africa/201ibya.html [http://perma.ccl9NR7-R7YC]
(archived Jan. 19, 2015).
51.
See Press Release, International Criminal Court, Pre-Trial Chamber I
Issues Three Warrants of Arrest for Muammar Gaddafi, Saif Al-Islam Gaddafi and
Abdualla Al-Senussi (June 27, 2011) (on file with author); see also Situation in the
Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, Case No. ICC-01/11-4-Red, Prosecutor's Application Pursuant
to Article 57 as to Muammar Mohammed Abu Minyar Gaddafi, Saif Al-Islam Gaddafi,
and Abdullah Al-Senussi (May 16, 2011), http://www.icc-cpi.intlicedocs/doc/docl073503.pdf
[http://perma.cclV5UB-9NPJ] (archived Jan. 19, 2015).
52.
See Kareem Fahim & David D. Kirkpatrick, Rebels Pour into Central
Tripoli, Declaring Victory over Qaddafi: Say They Captured 2 Qaddafi Sons - Crowds
Rejoice, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 20, 2011), http://query.nytimes.com/gst/fullpage.html?res
=9DO4E3D81F39F931A1575BCOA9679D8B63 [http://perma.cc/S34J-PFRV] (archived
Jan. 19, 2015).
53.
See Kareem Fahim et al., Violent End to an Era as Qaddafi Dies in Libya,
N.Y. TIMES. (Oct. 20, 2011), http://www.nytimes.com/2011/10/21/worldlafrica/qaddafiis-killed-as-libyan-forces-take-surt.html?pagewanted=all [http://perma.cc/6238-UUHY]
(archived Jan. 19, 2015).
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Saif Al-Islam was subsequently captured by a local militia while
trying to escape Libya and was held by local authorities in the
southern town of Zintan. 54 Abdullah Al-Senussi was found in
Mauritania several months later, in early 2012,55 and in September
2012 was extradited back to Libya. 56
After the war ended, Libya's National Transitional Council
(NTC) made clear that it intended to try Gaddafi, and later, Senussi,
in Libyan court.57 However, charges against both Gaddafi and
Senussi had already been confirmed in the ICC. The result was
litigation between the ICC and the NTC. In April 2012, the ICC
ordered the Libyan government to surrender Gaddafi to its custody. 58
The Libyan government refused and challenged the admissibility of
the case against Gaddafi, invoking complementarity and Article 17 of
the Rome Statute.5 9 The Senussi proceedings followed a similar
pattern after Senussi was captured. The ICC demanded that Libya
surrender Senussi but the Libyan government refused and

54.
See Clifford Krauss & David D. Kirkpatrick, Libyan Fighters Catch
Qaddafi's Last Fugitive Son, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 19, 2011), http://www.nytimes.com/2011/
11/20/worldlafrica/gaddafi-son-captured-seif-al-islam-qaddafi-libya.html?pagewanted=all
[http://perma.cc/7MX5-ZJ86] (archived Jan. 19, 2015).
55.
See David D. Kirkpatrick, Spy Chief and Torturer for Qaddafi is Captured,
N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 17, 2012), http://www.nytimes.com/2012/03/18/worldlafrica/ex-libyaintelligence-chief-captured-in-mauritania.html [http://perma.cc/PSP7-2F7L] (archived
Jan. 19, 2015).
56.
See David D. Kirkpatrick & Suliman Ali Zway, Spy Chief for Qaddafi Is
Extraditedto Libya, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 5, 2012), http://www.nytimes.com/2012/09/06/world/
africa/senussi-qaddafi-spy-chief-is-extradited-to-libya.html?_r-0 [http://perma.ccIKH4U-KT5X]
(archived Jan. 19, 2015).
57.
See Libya Says its Courts Capable of Trying Spy Chief Abdullah Senussi,
TELEGRAPH (Mar. 18, 2012), http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/africaandindi
anocean/libya/9151301/Libya-says-its-courts-capable-of-trying-spy-chief-Abdullah-Senussi
.html [http://perma.cc/8DL3-PAKL] (archived Jan. 19, 2015); Ingrid Formanek,
Transitional Government Prefers to Try Gadhafi Son in Libya, CNN (Oct. 30, 2011),
http://www.cnn.com/2011/10/30/world/africallibya-gadhafi-son/ [http://perma.cc/2FC6-GGZ7]
(archived Jan. 19, 2015).
58.
See Prosecutor v. Gaddafi & Al-Senussi, Case No. ICC-01/11-01/11,
Decision Regarding Second Request by Libya for Postponement of the Surrender of Saif
Al-Islam Gaddafi (Apr. 4, 2012), http://www.icenow.org/documents/Decision-Regarding
-Second ..Request byGovernmentofLibyajfor .Postponement.pdf [http://perma.cclLRL4LURK] (archived Jan. 19, 2015); see also Ivana Sekularak & Marie-Louise Gumuchian,
ICC Rejects Libya's Request Over Gaddafi Son Surrender, REUTERS (Apr. 4, 2012),
http://www.reuters.comlarticle/2012/04/04/us-libya-icc-idUSBRE8331BJ20120404 [http://
perma.ccIR78P-H9YH] (archived Jan. 19, 2015) (discussing the ICC's surrender
decision).
59.
See Prosecutor v. Gaddafi & AI-Senussi, Case No. ICC-01/11-01/11,
Application on Behalf of the Government of Libya Pursuant to Article 19 of the ICC
Statute (May 1, 2012), http://www.ice-cpi.int/iccdocs/doc/docl405819.pdf [http://perma.ccl
U5H4-R6FV] (archived Jan. 19, 2015).
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subsequently filed a complementarity-based challenge to the ICC
case's admissibility. 60
The litigation between the ICC and NTC for Gaddafi and Senussi
set up a fascinating legal controversy that had the potential to
radically shape the ICC's complementarity jurisprudence. The core
legal position advanced by the Prosecutor in both cases was a version
of Heller's new "modified due process theory." According to the
Prosecutor, a state should be considered "unwilling" to prosecute
under Article 17 "where the national investigation or proceedings
lack fundamental procedural rights and guarantees to such a degree
that the national efforts can no longer be held to be consistent with
the object and purpose of the Statute and Article 21(3)."61 Gaddafi's
and Senussi's defense teams, both of which preferred trial in the ICC
to trial in Libya, advanced stronger positions. 62 Proceeding from a
pro-due process legal position, the defense teams argued that Libya
could not establish complementarity because of significant due
process flaws in the Libyan proceedings." The Prosecutor agreed in
the Gaddafi case that Libya's lack of control over the defendant could
ground an inability finding 64 but argued in the Senussi case that

60.
See Prosecutor v. Gaddafi & AI-Senussi, Case No. ICC-01/11-01/11,
Application on Behalf of the Government of Libya Relating to Abdullah Al-Senussi
Pursuant to Article 19 of the ICC Statute, (Apr. 2, 2013), http://www.icccpi.int/iccdocs/doc/docl575650.pdf [http://perma.cc/R4UZ-ZRZ3] (archived Jan. 19,
2015); see also ICC Demands Libya Hand Over Gaddafi Ex-Spy Chief Senussi, AHRAM
ONLINE (Feb. 7, 2013), http://english.ahram.org.eg/NewsContent/2/8/64283/World/Region/
ICC-demands-Libya-hand-over-Gaddafi-exspy-chief-Se.aspx [http://perma.cc/6RRT-BNK7]
(archived Jan. 19, 2015) (discussing the ICC's demand that Libya hand over AlSenussi).
61.
Prosecutor v. Gaddafi & Al-Senussi, Case No. ICC-01/11-01/11, Decision on
the Admissibility of the Case Against Abdullah Al-Senussi, T 188 (Oct. 11, 2013)
[hereinafter Decision on Admissibility Against Al-Senussi].
62.
See id. $1 179-84 (listing arguments by the defense); Prosecutor v. Gaddafi
& Al-Senussi, Case No. ICC-01/11-01/11, Decision on the Admissibility of the Case
Against Saif Al-Islam Gaddafi, T¶ 154-76 (May 31, 2013) [hereinafter Decision on
Admissibility Against Gaddafi] (outlining the defense's arguments).
According to Gaddafi's defense counsel, a core problem was that the Libyan
63.
government did not physically possess the defendant, as the Zintan militia that had
originally captured Gadaffi had not yet surrendered him to the NTC. In the Senussi
case, the defense's core allegation was that Al-Senussi had not been given access to
legal counsel, despite having been held for over a year. See Decision on Admissibility
Against Al-Senussi, supra note 61, ¶ 183; Decision on Admissibility Against Gaddafi,
supra note 62, ¶ 162. Additionally, in both cases various due process flaws were alleged
by the defense: Libya's procedures offered insufficient protections to defendants,
Libya's court system appeared biased against former members of the Gaddafi regime,
and Libya lacked the capacity to summon and protect witnesses, ensure timely
proceedings, and manage a massive trial for complex international crimes. See Decision
on Admissibility Against Al-Senussi, supra note 61, $$ 179-84; Decision on
Admissibility Against Gaddafi, supra note 62.
64.
See Decision on Admissibility Against Gaddafi, supra note 62, 1¶ 139-54
(listing the Prosecutor's submissions).
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Libya was not "unwilling" or "unable" under Article 17 and that the
ICC case was inadmissible. 65
Libya responded to both the factual and legal allegations
advanced by the Prosecutor and the defense teams. Factually, Libya
disputed that it was not providing sufficient due process to Gaddafi
and Senussi, arguing that its judicial system would handle both cases
in a fair manner. 66 Legally, Libya advanced a version of the original
Heller argument, arguing that the only relevant consideration in the
Article 17 "unwillingness" inquiry is whether the state is genuinely
attempting to convict the defendant, with due process considerations
being irrelevant. 6 7
The Pre-Trial Chamber's decision in the Gaddafi case was issued
first, at the end of May 2013. Rejecting Libya's arguments, the Court
ruled that the ICC's case against Gaddafi was admissible. 68 The
Chamber first attempted to address the legal question of due process.
The Chamber explained,
[T]he ability of a State genuinely to carry out an investigation or
prosecution must be assessed in the context of the relevant national
system and procedures. In other words, the Chamber must assess
whether the Libyan authorities are capable of investigating or
prosecuting Mr Gaddafi "in accordance with the substantive and
69
procedural law applicable in Libya."

However, after explaining that national procedure is the touchstone
in the "inability" inquiry, the Chamber noted in describing Libya's
national procedure that "Libya has ratified relevant human rights
instruments."70
After laying out its legal standard for inability under Article 17,
the Chamber concluded that Libya's "national system cannot yet be
applied in full in areas or aspects relevant to the case."71 The
Chamber first noted that Libya did not actually possess control over
Gaddafi and was "not persuaded that this problem may be resolved in
the near future,"7 2 a fact it found particularly damning because
Libyan criminal procedure does not provide for trial in absentia.7 3

65.

See Decision on Admissibility Against Al-Senussi, supra note 61,

¶¶

185-

90.
66.
See id. 1 176; see also Decision on Admissibility Against Gaddafi, supra
note 62, ¶¶ 182-96. According to Libya, deficits like the lack of control over Saif and
the lack of legal counsel were being remedied and would be resolved.
67.
See Decision on Admissibility Against Al-Senussi, supra note 61, ¶¶ 17374.
68.
See Decision on Admissibility Against Gaddafi, supra note 62, 1 219.
Id. ¶ 200.
69.
70.
Id. ¶ 202.
71.
Id. ¶ 205.
72.
Id. 1 207.
73.
See id. ¶ 208 ("[I]n absentia trials are not permitted under Libyan law
when the accused is present on Libyan territory and his location is known.").
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The Chamber also identified as a factor in its decision Libya's "lack of
capacity to obtain the necessary testimony due to the inability of
judicial and governmental authorities to ascertain control and
provide adequate witness protection."7 4 Finally, the Chamber focused
on Libya's failure to secure legal representation for Gaddafi and,
despite Libya's submission that Gaddafi would be provided with a
lawyer, concluded that its assurances "fall short of substantiating
may be
whether and how the difficulties in securing a lawyer ...
overcome in the future."7 5 On the basis of these factors, the Pre-Trial
Chamber concluded that Libya was unable to carry out the
investigation or prosecution of Gaddafi and accordingly did not reach
the question of whether Libya was "unwilling" under Article 17.76 In
May 2014, the Appeals Chamber affirmed the original decision and
confirmed the legitimacy of the Pre-Trial Chamber's approach
without extensive additional analysis.7 7
The Pre-Trial Chamber promulgated its decision in the Senussi
complementarity challenge in October 2013. The court applied a legal
standard similar to that from the Gaddafi case, but reached the
opposite result, concluding that Libya was neither unable nor
unwilling to prosecute Senussi and accordingly that the ICC case
against Senussi was inadmissible.7 8 Although the court acknowledged
that unwillingness and inability are distinct legal issues, it declared
at the outset that it would "not attempt a separate analysis of the two
aspects" because both issues were dependent on the same nucleus of
facts.79 The Chamber also reiterated the Gaddafi court's stance that
inability and unwillingness "must be assessed in light of [Libyan]
law," and restated its conclusion that Libya's ratification of
international human rights instruments was relevant to the
assessment of Libyan national law.80 However, the Chamber went
beyond the Gaddafi explanation of due process in Article 17, holding
that "as far as the State's alleged unwillingness [under Article 17] is
concerned

.

.

. depending

on the

specific

circumstances,

certain

violations of the procedural rights of the accused may be relevant to
the assessment of the independence and impartiality of the national
proceedings that the Chamber is required to make, having regard to

74.
Id. ¶ 209.
75.
Id. ¶ 214.
See id. ¶¶ 215, 218 ("Libya has been found to be unable genuinely to carry
76.
out the investigation or prosecution against Mr Gaddafi. Therefore, the Chamber need
not address the alternative requirement of 'willingness' ....
).
77.
See Prosecutor v. Gaddafi & Al-Senussi, Case No. ICC-01/11-01/11,
Judgment on the Appeal of Libya Against the Decision of Pre-Trial Chamber I of 31
May 2013 Entitled "Decision on the Admissibility of the Case Against Saif Al-Islam
Gaddafi," (May 21, 2014).
78.
See Gaddafi & Al-Senussi, Decision on Admissibility Against Al-Senussi,
supra note 61, $$ 293, 310.
See id. T 170-71.
79.
80.
See id. 1 203.
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the principles of due process recognized under international law."81
However, the Chamber noted that even when international due
process concerns are implicated, a violation of the Article 17
unwillingness requirement inheres "only when the manner in which
the proceedings are being conducted .

.

. is

. . .

inconsistent with the

intent to bring the person to justice."82
The Chamber then turned to evidence pointing toward Libya's
Article 17 inability or unwillingness. The Chamber first considered
and rejected the defense's argument that Libya's failure to bring
Senussi to trial (despite having had custody of him for over a year)
constituted an unjustified delay inconsistent with an intent to bring
Senussi to justice. The Chamber noted that Al-Senussi had not been
provided with a lawyer, despite legal counsel being a requirement
under Libyan law and Senussi having been subject to numerous
interrogations. The Chamber acknowledged that Libya's failure to
provide
Senussi
with
counsel
weighed
against
Libya's
complementarity argument but concluded that it was primarily the
result of the security situation in Libya and dismissed the argument
as insufficient to ground an unwillingness finding.83
The Chamber also considered the defense's suggestion that the
substantive treatment of Senussi at the hands of Libya might be in
violation of due process norms, potentially including norms against
torture, mistreatment of prisoners, and procedural rights.84 On this
point, the Chamber held that the defense had not raised the
allegations with an adequate degree of specificity to make it
necessary for the Chamber to determine whether they were relevant
to Article 17,85 and it also suggested that it found convincing Libya's
responses to the charges. 86 Finally, the Chamber addressed and
dismissed a number of other defense arguments it found less
compelling, including that the Libyan judiciary was biased against
Senussi and that Libya lacked effective control over detention
facilities and the ability to address security challenges relevant to a
potential trial.8 7 After rejecting each of the defense's arguments, the
Chamber found the ICC case inadmissible on complementarity
grounds and left Senussi to Libya.

Id. ¶ 235.
81.
82.
Id. However, the chamber did not provide any specific further guidance on
the meaning of the term "bring to justice."
83.
See id. ¶ 292.
84.
See id. ¶ 238.
85.
See id. ¶ 239 ("[Tihe Chamber considers that the above submissions by the
Defence amount to generic assertions without any tangible proof.").
86.
See id. ¶ 240 ("[Mlost of these matters put forward by the Defence have
indeed been addressed by Libya in its submissions before the Chamber.").
87.
See id. I¶ 263-65.
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The Appeals Chamber subsequently affirmed the Pre-Trial
Chamber's judgment.88 Addressing a variety of challenges to the
underlying proceeding brought by Senussi, the Appeals Chamber
concluded first that Libya's failure to appoint counsel for Senussi did
not make it unwilling to prosecute under the Rome Statute.89 The
Pre-Trial Chamber's determination that counsel had not been
appointed because of security reasons was "not unreasonable,"
according to the Appeals Chamber.90
The Appeals Chamber also considered whether the procedural
deficiencies in Libya's domestic prosecution were sufficient to render
it "unwilling" under Article 17. The Chamber explained that "the
primary reason" for the inclusion of Article 17(2) was not to
guarantee fair trial rights of the accused and noted that "the Court
was not established to be an international court of human rights." 9
However, it also noted that "[t]he concept of independence and
impartiality is one familiar in the area of human rights law" and that
"human rights standards may assist the Court in its assessment of
whether the proceedings are or were conducted 'independently or
impartially' within the meaning of article 17(2)(c)." 92 Though the

Chamber left unclear how this standard should be applied in practice,
it observed that "[alt its most extreme, the Appeals Chamber would
not envisage proceedings that are, in reality, little more than a
predetermined prelude to an execution, and which are therefore
contrary to even our most basic understanding of justice, as being
sufficient to render a case inadmissible."9 3 Applying this standard to
Senussi's case, the Appeals Chamber held that the Pre-Trial
Chamber's conclusions were not unreasonable. 94
B. Signs of a Limited Due Process Jurisprudence
In addressing complementarity and Article 17 generally, ICC
officials have frequently stressed that the Court's role is not to render
judgments on domestic judicial systems. 95 Some academic

88.
See Prosecutor v. Gaddafi & Al-Senussi, Case No. ICC-01/11-01/11 OA 6,
Judgment on the Appeal of Mr Abdullah Al-Senussi Against the Decision of Pre-Trial
Chamber I of 11 Oct. 2013 Entitled "Decision on the Admissibility of the Case Against
Abdullah Al-Senussi," T 170, (July 24, 2014) [hereinafter Judgment on Appeal of AlSenussi] (dismissing the argument that the Pre-Trial Chamber misapplied the
evidentiary standard).
89.
See id. ¶ 200.
Id. T 201.
90.
Id. TT 218-19.
91.
Id. ¶ 220.
92.
Id. ¶ 230.
93.
Id. ¶ 239.
94.
95.
See, e.g., OTP PAPER, supranote 6 (discussing the nature of the ICC).
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commentators have made similar points. 9 6 However, since the PreTrial Chamber began developing a jurisprudence of the "unwilling"
and "unable" prongs of Article 17 in Gaddafi, it has become apparent
that, to a limited extent, the ICC is willing to judge the quality of
domestic court proceedings when it assesses the second arm of
complementarity. The Gaddafi and Senussi opinions, when
understood in the context of the broader complementarity
jurisprudence, show that the Court is willing to make difficult
judgments about whether state judicial systems provide defendants
with sufficient due process for the ICC to relinquish a case. At least to
a limited extent, the Court open to using international norms of due
process when doing it.
When the ICC adjudicates the second arm of complementarity, it
addresses questions about whether the domestic state will do
something in the prosecution of a particular defendant. Will the state
provide legal representation to the accused? Will the state protect
witnesses to allow for a full presentation of the evidence at trial?
(These sorts of questions are particularly salient in cases, like Libya,
where the primary danger is an overzealous prosecution, rather than
a recalcitrant one.) Thus, a primary consequence of the Court's
consideration of due process is that it must make subjective
judgments about the future capacity of domestic institutions. In other
words, the inquiry of the second arm of Article 17 appears to be
whether the Court trusts the state challenging complementarity to
stay within minimal due process bounds. The remainder of this
subpart is devoted to showing that the seeds of this predictive
jurisprudence are present in the Court's recent decisions on
complementarity. To be clear, this subpart's claim is not that the
Court has fully embraced a predictive, due process-centric model, but
rather that the Court's recent decisions suggest that it remains open
to such a system.
Three factors in particular from the recent cases suggest the
emergence a new predictive due process model in the ICC:
1. The continuing viability of a limited due process thesis: For all
the bluster of the Court in the Gaddafi and Senussi decisions about
the importance of respecting state procedural due process norms and
the Rome Statute's limited text, both cases suggest that the Court
may, at least to a limited extent, consider international due process
standards when making decisions under the second limb of Article 17.

96.
See, e.g., M6gret & Samson, supra note 41, at 581. But see Markus Benzing,
The Complementarity Regime of the International Criminal Court: International
Criminal Justice between State Sovereignty and the Fight Against Impunity, 7 MAX
PLANCK Y.B. OF UN L. 591, 597 (2003) ("[It may be argued that the Court is an
institution entrusted with the protection of human rights of the accused in the national
enforcement of international criminal justice.").
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The Appeals Chamber's opinion in Senussi is arguably more skeptical
of due process considerations, but it, too, leaves open the door for such
considerations to play a role under Article 17.
The Gaddafi opinion supports the due process connection
somewhat subtly. As discussed in Part III.A, the Gaddafi opinion
takes pains to explain that the inability analysis should be conducted
with reference to Libyan procedural norms. Thus, one reading of the
opinion (perhaps even the most obvious reading) is that it is adopting
the new Heller thesis-that the ICC's due process analysis is to be
guided exclusively by the state's own standards of due process.
However, after providing this disclaimer, the Gaddafi court did not
merely analyze Libyan law-rather, it stipulated "that Libya has
ratified relevant human rights instruments."9 7 Because ratified
treaties become part of a state's domestic law, the Court's reference to
international norms in this context can be understood to mean that a
state's failure to abide by its own international law obligations is
relevant to the Article 17 calculus. In referencing Libya's ratification
of human rights instruments, the Gaddafi court pointed to specific
human rights instruments ratified by Libya, including the ICCPR,
the UN Convention Against Torture, and the African Charter on
99
Human and People's Rights.9 8 The ICCPR has 167 states parties,
including every country where the ICC has initiated a prosecution
and all states but one in Africa. Many other human rights
instruments have similarly universal acceptance. 0 0 Thus, at a
minimum, treaty based-human rights norms will virtually always be
relevant-at least to a limited extent-to the Article 17 inability
analysis. Moreover, if one reads the opinion more broadly, one could
conclude that customary international law norms-which are
generally thought of as part of the law of domestic states 1 0 1-are also
relevant.

97.
Decision on Admissibility Against Gaddafi, supra note 62, 1 202.
98
See id. ¶ 202 n.335.
99.
See International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, UNITED NATIONS
TREATY COLLECTION (last visited Feb. 3, 2015), https://treaties.un.org/pages/viewdetails
.aspx?src-treaty&mtdsg-no-iv-4&chapter=4&lang-en [http://perma.cclUY94-NPXD] (archived
Jan. 15, 2015); Investigations, INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT (last visited Feb. 3,
2015, 8:52 PM), http://www.icc-cpi.intlen-menus/icc/structre%20of%2the%20court/office
%20of%2the%20prosecutor/investigations/Pages/investigationsnew.aspx [http://perma.cc/
8BGY-JRLU] (archived Jan. 15, 2015).
100.

See ANNE F. BAYEFSKY, REPORT: THE UN HUMAN RIGHTS TREATY SYSTEM:

UNIVERSALITY AT THE CROSSROADS 2 (2001), available at http://www.bayefsky.com/
report/finalreport.pdf [http://perma.cc/SHW6-E6XFI (archived Jan. 15, 2015) (noting
that "every UN member state is a party to one or more of the six major human rights
treaties" and "80% of states have ratified four or more").
101.
See The Paquete Habana, 175 U.S. 677, 707 (1900) ("The examples and
practice generally followed establish this humane and beneficent exception as an
international rule, and this rule may be considered as adopted by customary law and
by all civilized nations.")
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The Pre-Trial Chamber's Senussi opinion also supports a limited
version of the due process thesis and its conclusions may reach even
further than that of the Gaddafi opinion. As discussed in Part III.A,
in discussing the relevance of due process considerations, the Senussi
Court explicitly stated that international due process concerns are
relevant insofar as they bear on one of the scenarios enumerated in
Article 17(2), such as the state's intent to bring the accused "to
justice." 102 Though the meaning of the term "bring to justice" is never
defined, leaving the ultimate question of the relevance of
international norms unsettled, this explanation coheres with an
account of complementarity that accepts the due process thesis, and
the Court's actual application of the unwillingness standard
suggested a concern for international norms. For example, the
Chamber relied on a report published by Human Rights Watch that
evaluated Libya's treatment of Senussi in the context of international
norms as evidence that Senussi's treatment in captivity did not
contravene Article 17.103 Such analysis goes beyond the Gaddafi
opinion because it interposes international human rights norms into
the analysis without any reference at all to Libya's acceptance of
those norms.
In its opinion affirming the judgment of the Pre-Trial Chamber,
the Appeals Chamber in Senussi likewise agreed that such
considerations have weight. In weighing Senussi's Article 17
challenge, the Appeals Chamber noted first that "the intent to bring
the person concerned to justice" discussed in Article 17 "cannot
primarily be concerned with whether there have been violations of
the rights of a suspect."1 04 At one point, the opinion went so far as to
characterize the jurisprudence of human rights tribunals as "of only
very limited relevance."os However, the Chamber's skepticism
toward due process principles writ large was more muted. In fact, the
Chamber specifically gave weight to whether the proceeding had been
conducted "independently or impartially" and noted that those

102.
See Decision on Admissibility Against AI-Senussi, supra note 61, f 235 ("In
order to have a bearing on the Chamber's determination, any such alleged violation
must be linked to one of the scenarios provided for in article 17(2) or (3).").
103.
See id. 1 240. Although it is possible to imagine the ICC making judgments
about the capacity of states solely with reference to their own domestic procedures, the
fact that international law remains relevant makes it far easier to foresee the ICC
engaging in a searching, capacity-based analysis of the judicial systems of states
challenging admissibility. The ICC's capacity to act as an arbiter of international due
process norms is perhaps limited, but it far outstrips the Court's ability to perform
meaningful analysis or application of domestic laws of constitutional and criminal
procedure. As an international court staffed with experts on international law, it is not
implausible that the ICC judges would be able to perform meaningful analysis of
treaties other than the Rome Statute.
104.
Judgment on Appeal of Al-Senussi, supra note 88, ¶ 221.
105.
Id. 1 169.
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Ultimately, the Chamber took up the show trial hypothetical and
noted that it could not countenance "proceedings that are, in reality,
little more than a predetermined prelude to an execution, and which
are therefore contrary to even the most basic understanding of
justice." However, the Chamber expressly declined to note exactly
when due process concerns become so overwhelming as to command
the Article 17 analysis, noting that "[w]hether a case will ultimately
be admissible in such circumstances will necessarily depend on its
precise facts."' 07 The Appeals Chamber's opinion illustrates the
tension in the question that is the subject of this Article. The
Chamber was clearly wary of transforming itself into a human rights
tribunal, yet it was plainly so bothered by the show trial hypothetical
that it left the door open for consideration of due process and human
rights norms.
Thus, at a minimum, the Court in the Libya cases-particularly
the Pre-Trial Chamber-has left itself more than enough room to
consider international due process norm in future complementarity
decisions, should it desire to do so.
2. The Pre-Trial Chamber's willingness to engage in predictive
analysis of due process considerations:Because consideration of due
process factors almost by definition entails consideration of what a
state will do (or will refrain from doing) to the accused in a
hypothetical future proceeding, the ICC's willingness to consider due
process factors necessitated a move away from the Court's approach
to the first limb of the complementarity test. Since the Appeals
Chamber's judgment in Katanga, it has been settled doctrine that
admissibility challenges brought under the first limb of Article 17
must be based on the facts as they exist at the time of the challenge,
not on the situation as it may exist in the future.1 0 8 Even before
Katanga, the Kony court declined to consider the impact on Article 17
of Ugandan laws not yet enforced, on the ground that doing so "would
be tantamount to engaging in hypothetical judicial determination,
which appears per se inappropriate."1 09 Although this rule remains
the stated doctrine of the Court, there is significant evidence in recent
opinions, particularly the Gaddafi and Senussi decisions, suggesting
that the Court has adopted a different kind of rule for challenges

Id. ¶ 220.
106.
107.
Id. 1 230.
108.
Katanga Judgment on Appeal, supra note 28, $$ 56, 80, 111; see also
Batros, supra note 29, at 580 ("The Appeals Chamber has ...
made it clear that the
[admissibility] determination must be based on the facts as they exist at the time of the
admissibility challenge.").
109.
Kony Decision on Admissibility, supra note 26, ¶¶ 49-51 (Mar. 10, 2009);
see also Batros, supra note 29, at 580 ("Given that admissibility must be determined
based on concrete facts, it cannot be based on what a participant claims can, will or
should happen in the future.").
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relating to unwillingness or inability to prosecute. In fact, the
defining characteristic of the ICC's recent complementarity
jurisprudence is the Court's willingness to engage in predictive
analysis of whether a state is likely to manage properly the
investigation or prosecution of a defendant and provide the defendant
with due process rights.
Addressing the second limb of the admissibility test for the first
time, the Pre-Trial Chamber in Gaddafi was not guarded about its
reliance on predictive judgments about the capacity of the Libyan
justice system. In determining that the inability prong was satisfied,
the Chamber's analysis was arguably framed as a prediction about
whether Libya would be able to prosecute Gaddafi, not a statement
about its inability, thus far, to do so: "The Chamber is of the view that
[Libya's] national system cannot yet be applied in full in areas or
aspects relevant to the case." 110 Though, again, this statement could
be read as a reference to the present state of the Libyan judiciary, its
full implication is inherently predictive. The Court examined the
Libyan judiciary and made a predictive judgment about whether it
would be able to handle the Gaddafi trial. The remainder of the
opinion contains similar predictive references. In paragraph 207, the
Chamber noted, with respect to Libya's inability to obtain Gaddafi,
that it "[was] not persuaded that this problem may be resolved in the
near future.""' In paragraph 211, the Chamber explained that it was
not "persuaded" that Libyan authorities had the capacity to ensure
protective measures of witnesses (and the Libyan proceedings had not
reached the point where witnesses were being called). 112 And in
paragraph 214, the Court concluded that Libya's failure to provide
Gaddafi with a lawyer was relevant to the inability analysis because
Libya's submissions "[fell] short of substantiating whether and how
the difficulties in securing a lawyer . . . may be overcome in the
future." 1 3
The Pre-Trial Chamber in Senussi was in some respects
schizophrenic about its desire to move into predictive analysis, but it,
too, ultimately engaged in numerous instances of predictive inquiry.
Although the Court took pains in some parts of the opinion to avoid
speculation about whether Libya would afford Senussi due process
guarantees, it made predictive inferences openly in others. The
Chamber's analysis of the unwillingness question (to the extent it is
distinguishable from the inability inquiry) was more closely grounded
in the present. In dismissing the defense's argument that Libya's
failure to provide a lawyer to Senussi evinced unwillingness, the

110.
111.
112.
113.

Decision on Admissibility Against Gaddafi, supra note 62,
Id. ¶ 207 (emphasis added).
Id. ¶211.
Id. 1 214 (emphasis added).

1

205.
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Chamber noted that "it appears that Mr. Al-Senussi's right to legal
representation has been primarily prejudiced so far by the security
situation in the country," 114 thus attempting to establish
unwillingness as a matter of intent, which is more easily established
without resorting to prediction or intensive analysis of the Libyan
judicial system. One could infer from the structure of the opinion,
however, that lurking under the surface of this statement was a
judgment that Libya would provide Senussi with a lawyer in the
future once the security concerns abated."1 5
The Pre-Trial Chamber's analysis of the inability question
centered squarely on a predictive assessment of whether Libya will be
able to try Senussi consonant with due process guarantees. Libya's
submissions on the inability point were future oriented. For example,
Libya noted with respect to its mechanisms for protecting witnesses
that "the sufficiency or otherwise of such measures should not be
judged prematurely and speculatively before the need for protective
measures has arisen."1 16 In rendering its decision on whether the
inability criterion was satisfied the Chamber made an explicitly
predictive judgment-that the Libyan judicial system had the
capacity to guarantee to Senussi sufficient due process rights. The
Chamber explained that "Libya appears to be in a position to address
the ongoing security difficulties in order that the proceedings against
Mr Al-Senussi not be hindered," 1 7 and, similarly, that there is "[n]o
indication that collection of evidence and testimony has ceased or will
cease because of unaddressed security concerns for witnesses in the
case against Mr Al Senussi."11 8
The Appeals Chamber in Senussi did not rely on predictive
analysis to the same degree as the Pre-Trial chamber in Senussi.
However, this is unsurprising given the Pre-Trial chamber's greater
emphasis on adjudicating factual matters. The Appeals Chamber did
explicitly validate the Pre-Trial's use of predictive analysis. The
Chamber noted that "it was not unreasonable for the Pre-Trial
Chamber to conclude that, although in the past it had not been
possible to appoint counsel for Mr Al-Senussi because of the security
situation, there was a prospect of this happening in the future.
Although the Pre-Trial Chamber's conclusion did involve an element
of prediction, this is not unreasonable for issues such as the present
one."' 1 9

114.
Decision on Admissibility Against Al-Senussi, supra note 61, 1 292.
115.
This inference is bolstered by the fact that Libya itself submitted as
evidence an assurance that it would provide Senussi with legal counsel. Id. 1 232.
116.
Id. ¶ 280.
117.
Id. T 303.
Id. 1 298 (emphasis added).
118.
119.
Judgment on Appeal of Al-Senussi, supra note 88, T 201.
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Although the Court has not fully embraced predictive analysis in
any of its opinions, the Court's recent cases show that the line
between officially permissible and impermissible reasoning is
extremely thin. Though the Court has stated in the past that
complementarity decisions must be made on the basis of the facts as
they exist at the time of the challenge, what actually comprises the
nucleus of "facts" that may be considered under this doctrine? Fully
instantiated occurrences certainly qualify: whether the defendant has
been provided with a lawyer, for example, is obviously valid evidence.
But what about occurrences that bear on the likelihood of something
happening in the future? For example, is an assurance from the state
that the defendant will be given a lawyer permissible evidence of the
state's compliance with due process norms? And finally, what about
future-oriented inferences from present-based facts? For example, can
the Court infer from the fact that a state generally does not provide
counsel to defendants charged with war crimes that the defendant at
issue will not be afforded counsel? These categories of questions are
not analytically distinct and they tend to blend together in practice.
Moreover, there is little in the Court's own jurisprudence that would
shed light on which are and are not permissible. Thus, in the Libya
decisions, there was ample room for the Court to play with the line it
had previously set with regards to predictive reasoning and to make
almost probabilistic determinations about the likelihood of the state
engaging in particular kinds of behavior in the future. In practice, it
is difficult to understand these kinds of determinations as anything
but predictive analysis.
3. The melding of the unwillingness and inability inquiries:
Strong evidence of the Court's shift toward predictive due process
analysis is found in the Court's structuring of the unwillingness and
inability inquiries in Gaddafi and Senussi. Since the Rome Statute
was first drafted, the unwillingness and the inability prongs under
Article 17(1) have been considered two distinct inquiries, an
understanding that was confirmed by the Pre-Trial Chamber in
Katanga.120 Unwillingness is determined by reference to the factors
outlined in Article 17(2), whereas the inability inquiry is guided by
the standard laid out in 17(3). The Gaddafi opinion followed this rule
strictly, considering inability exclusively and deliberately refraining
from reaching the unwillingness inquiry.' 21 However, there is
evidence in the Senussi opinion that this norm may be giving way, in
practice if not exactly in form.

120.
See Katanga Judgment on Appeal, supra note 28, 1 3 (quoting Prosecutor v.
Ngudjolo, Decision on the Evidence and Information Provided by the Prosecution for
the Issuance of a Warrant of Arrest for Mathieu Ngudjolo Chui, ¶¶ 19-20 (July 6,
2007)).
121.
See Decision on Admissibility Against Gaddafi, supra note 62.
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Although the Pre-Trial Chamber's Senussi decision's analysis of
Article 17 began by distinguishing between unwillingness and
inability, the Pre-Trial Chamber concluded that "the two limbs of the
admissibility test, while distinct, are nonetheless intimately and
inextricably linked," and that evidence relevant to each limb may
overlap.1 22 Thus, the Chamber proceeded to analyze the vast majority
of the claims put forward by the parties without regard to whether
they pertained to unwillingness or inability, and in several instances
the Chamber appeared to use the two terms interchangeably.1 23 The
opinion's final section, in which the Court separates unwillingness
from inability before rendering its final holdings, is truncated and
conclusory.1 24
Although this shift may seem surprising, given the Court's prior
insistence on the distinctiveness of the two inquiries, it is a logical
consequence of the Court's use of predictive due process analysis.
Analysis of due process concerns necessarily entails a subjective, factintensive inquiry of the kind typically associated with human rights
tribunals. To adjudicate due process concerns, the Court cannot
simply focus on the literal meanings of "unwilling" and "unable" in
the statute-under international law, it must conduct something
closer to an all-things-considered inquiry into whether Libya's alleged
actions were permissible limitations on the rights of the
defendants.' 2 5 This kind of inquiry does not fit neatly into the
unwilling or unable framework, as it entails questions into both the
capacity and the intent of the state challenging complementarity.
Thus, the peculiar structure of the Senussi opinion can be understood
as a product of the Court's willingness to engage in due process
analysis.1

26

C. Intensive, PredictiveAnalysis of State's Judicial Systems is
Inevitable
The previous subpart of this Article attempted to show that the
ICC is moving toward a system in which the Court makes subjective
assessments of the judicial systems of states challenging
complementarity, including predictive judgments about the likelihood
that states will abide by certain basic due process principles. This
subpart argues that such a shift is inevitable. Applying a rational
actor view to the ICC that treats ICC judges as autonomous actors
with distinct preferences, it becomes clear that the panels of judges

-

122.
Decision on Admissibility Against Al-Senussi, supra note 61, 1 210.
123.
See, e.g., id. IT 221, 233, 243.
124.
See id. ¶¶ 289-310.
125.
See infra Part IV.C.
126.
Admittedly, the structure of the Senussi opinion does not prove that the
court is engaging in due process analysis, but it does constitute probative evidence that
such analysis is occurring.
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deciding complementarity challenges have strong incentives to
engage in predictive analysis of state judicial systems and, more
generally, to assess whether domestic legal systems are willing or
able to abide by basic due process norms. Although the normative
valence of this system is a question beyond the scope of this Article, a
system of substantial analysis of domestic legal systems may be the
best possible arrangement given the Rome Statute's current
structure, at least for those who wish to see the ICC continue to build
legitimacy among states party to the Rome Statute.
Three assumptions undergird this argument. The first
assumption is that the judges who serve on the ICC have a preference
to see the ICC continue to gain support as a mainstay of the
international criminal justice system. On this point there is no direct
proof, save various statements and articles from ICC judges opining
on the court's prospects.' However, it stands to reason that people
who play an important and highly public role in a high-profile
institution have an interest in that institution's success. The second,
related assumption is that a relevant metric for the success of the
ICC is its legitimacy among stakeholders, including states parties,
the United Nations, and the populations of states in which the ICC
initiates investigations and prosecutions. Some commenters might
dispute the importance of legitimacy, particularly short-term
legitimacy, as a touchstone for success, perhaps focusing more on the
number of convictions obtained or crimes averted.12 8 However, Luis
Moreno-Ocampo himself has stressed the importance of building the
court's legitimacy,12 9 and many scholars have made similar points.1 30

&

127.
See, e.g., Franck Petit, Interview with ICC Judge Bruno Cotte, Presiding
Judge at the Second Trial of the ICC, RADIO NETHERLANDS WORLDWIDE (June 20,
2012, 10:31 AM), http://www.rnw.nl/international-justicelarticle/judge-cotte-%E2%80%9Cweare-making-progress%E2%80%9D [http://perma.cc/Q7UH-2YBB] (archived Jan. 15, 2015)
(discussing with a sitting ICC judge ways in which the ICC can improve its legitimacy
amongst populations in states where investigations have taken place); An Interview
with Judge Kirsch, Former ICC President, INTERNATIONAL BAR ASSOCIATION (last
visited Apr. 4, 2014), http://www.ibanet.org/Article/Detail.aspx?ArticleUid=d33d6a9cd3f5-481a-82c1-928a3cbdc857 [http://perma.cc/6LGS-RFMQ] (archived Jan. 15, 2015)
(discussing ways for the ICC to succeed in the future); Mark Kersten, An Interview
with the ICC's Judge Howard Morrison, JUSTICE IN CONFLICT (Mar. 4, 2012),
http://justiceinconflict.org/2012/03/04/an-interview-with-the-iccs-judge-howard-morrison/
[http://perma.cc/TU22-JNJX] (archived Jan. 15, 2015) (discussing ICC judge's long
career in international criminal law and sensitivity to criticisms of the Court).
128.
See James F. Alexander, The International Criminal Court and the
Prevention of Atrocities: Predicting the Court's Impact, 54 VILL. L. REV. 1, 4 (2009)
(emphasizing prevention of atrocities as a core goal of the ICC); Lilian A. Barria
Steven D. Roper, How Effective Are International Criminal Tribunals? An Analysis of
the ICTY and the ICTR, 9 INT'L J. HUM. RTS. 349, 349 (2006) (measuring the success of
international criminal tribunals based on the number of individuals apprehended).
129.
See Sheila Velez, Luis Moreno-Ocampo, Chief Prosecutorof the ICC: "I Have
the Most Important Mission in the World", AEGIS (Feb. 22, 2011), http-/www.aegistrustorg'
index.php/International-Justice/luis-moreno-ocampo-chief-prosecutor-of-the-ic-qi-have-the-
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Because the court has weak independent investigatory powers13 1 and
lacks the ability to track down and obtain fugitives on its own, its
operations are dependent on state support, making legitimacy among
states crucial. 132
The third, and perhaps most controversial, assumption is that
the jurisprudence of ICC judges is influenced by their desire to see
the ICC gain legitimacy and succeed. To date, many of the most
prominent studies of Rome Statute doctrine have considered ICC
decisions in a vacuum, assuming implicitly that the ICC can and will
interpret the Statute in the way that makes the best sense of its
language and structure.13 3 Though such analyses are valuable, there
is ample empirical and historical evidence that judges are influenced
by their desire to protect the institutional credibility of the courts on
which they serve. 134 There is also evidence that other components of
the ICC have made decisions, in part, based on policy
considerations.13 5 Though I am not aware of any study systematically
documenting legitimacy-conserving behavior in ICC judges, scholars
have previously suggested that certain ICC decisions were motivated
by policy factors, such as institutional credibility.1 36 Given all that is

most-important-mission-in-the-worldq.html [http://perma.cc/75CC-7AHH] (archived Jan.
15, 2015).
130.
See Philippe Kirsch, The International Criminal Court: A New And
Necessary Institution Meriting Continued International Support, 28 FORDHAM INT'L
L.J. 292, 306 (2005) ("The support of States, inter-governmental and non-governmental
organizations ('NGOs'), and the international community at large, is necessary for [the
ICC's] success."); Vessilin Popovski, International Criminal Court: A Necessary Step
Towards Global Justice, 31 SEC. DIALOGUE, 405, 405-06 (2000) (arguing that an
important measure of the ICC's success is its influence over domestic states in setting
standards of conduct).
131.
See, e.g., William W. Burke-White, Proactive Complementarity: The
InternationalCriminal Court and National Courts in the Rome System of International
Justice, 49 HARV. INT'L L.J. 53, 64-65 (2008) (describing how the ICC was deliberately
created as a court of limited powers).
132.
See Allison Marston Danner, Enhancingthe Legitimacy and Accountability
of ProsecutorialDiscretion at the InternationalCriminal Court, 97 AM. J. INT'L L. 510,
534-36 (2003) (arguing that the ICC is dependent on legitimacy amongst states parties
to ensure compliance from states where investigations occur).
133.
See, e.g., Heller, supra note 11; Carsten Stahn, Complementarity, Amnesties
and Alternative Forms of Justice: Some Interpretative Guidelines for the International
CriminalCourt, 3 J. INT'L CRIM. JUSTICE 695 (2005).
134.
See RICHARD H. FALLON, JR., THE DYNAMIC CONSTITUTION: AN
INTRODUCTION TO AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW AND PRACTICE 357-58 (2013)

(noting that the U.S. Supreme Court operates within "politically constructed bounds"
and shapes its decisions to preserve institutional legitimacy); TOM S. CLARK, THE
LIMITS OF JUDICIAL INDEPENDENCE 14-15 (2011) (noting that decisions of courts in
both the United States and abroad are sometimes motivated by legitimacy-related
considerations).
135.
See Margaret M. deGuzman, Choosing to Prosecute:Expressive Selection at
the International CriminalCourt, 33 MICH. J. INT'L L. 265, 271-74 (2012).
136.
See Van Schaack, supra note 8 (asserting that a Pre-Trial Chamber
decision was at least partially motivated by recognition that the country involved
would not cooperate in a transfer).
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known from legal realism about how judges make decisions,13 7 the
conclusion that ICC judges are influenced by legitimacy and
credibility considerations seems reasonable.
Accepting these assumptions, it is only logical that the ICC will
evaluations
of states challenging
tend toward predictive
complementarity and their legal systems that incorporate basic
international due process norms. The reason is that such a system is
the one most likely to preserve the Court's legitimacy amongst key
actors. To see why, it is necessary to consider the dynamics of
complementarity challenges. The first key point is that the structure
of the Rome Statute encourages states to bring complementarity
challenges as quickly as possible. Article 19(4) requires that most
challenges to admissibility brought prior to commencement of trial in
the ICC.' 38 The Trial Chamber used this provision to construct a
tripartite system to govern when states may bring admissibility
challenges: (1) prior to confirmation of a case, state challenges may be
brought based on any aspect of admissibility, (2) after a case has been
confirmed but before trial, complementarity challenges may only be
brought on the principle of ne bis in idem under Article 17(1)(1) (thus
excluding all unwillingness or inability challenges), 9 and (3) after
the Trial Chamber has been constituted, challenges (limited to
17(1)(c) challenges) may only be made in exceptional circumstances
with the leave of the Chamber.1 40 The jurisprudence on when a
challenge may be brought is still sparse, but the case law as it exists
provides a clear incentive for states that wish to bring a challenge to
do so as early as possible to ensure it will be heard. The result is that
when the Pre-Trial Chamber hears an admissibility challenge, the
domestic investigation or prosecution of the national state normally
will be at an early stage. In general, domestic investigations or
prosecutions tend to lag behind parallel ICC investigations or
prosecutions, so it seems exceedingly unlikely that the Pre-Trial
Chamber will ever hear an admissibility challenge where the
domestic proceeding has reached the point of a trial. Far more likely
is the Libya scenario: the domestic state has begun an investigation,

137.
Studies have also suggested that judges on international courts specifically
are influenced by nondoctrinal considerations in reaching decisions. See Erik Voeten,
The Impartiality of International Judges: Evidence From The European Court of
Human Rights, 102 AM. POL. Scl. REV. 417 (2008).
138.
See Rome Statute, supra note 1, pmbl., art. 19.
139.
In other words, an admissibility challenge brought after a case has been
confirmed is only permissible if the basis of the challenge is that the ICC case would
subject the accused to trial for an office for which he/she has already been tried. See id.
art. 17(1)(a).
140.
See Katanga Judgment on Appeal, supra note 28, IT 28-29; Batros, supra
note 29, at 23.
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is gathering evidence, and perhaps has reached the point of pre-trial
procedural wrangling.
Also critical is the fact that Article 19 of the Rome Statute
severely limits states' ability to bring multiple admissibility
challenges. Under Article 19(4), a person or state may challenge
admissibility only once, with subsequent challenges availability in
"exceptional circumstances." 14 1 Although, again, the meaning of
"exceptional circumstances" remains unclear, it seems relatively
unlikely that the Court will grant a second hearing with any
frequency. The result is that when the Court adjudicates an
admissibility challenge-most of which will come when domestic
proceedings are still nascent-it is producing what in all likelihood is
the final word on the admissibility of the case. Unlike human rights
courts, some of which may reserve the ability to revisit their decisions
about domestic legal proceedings as they progress further, the PreTrial Chamber must attempt to resolve complementarity issues
conclusively while parallel domestic proceedings are still unfolding.
Assume for a moment that the only goal of ICC judges in their
complementarity opinions is to maximize the Court's legitimacy. How
should they handle complementarity challenges? One axis the Court
would have to consider is whether it should be more deferential or
less deferential to the state challenging complementarity with respect
to due process issues. It is not immediately obvious how the
legitimacy goal interacts with this choice. One possibility is that
being more deferential to states would increase legitimacy by
demonstrating the ICC's respect for traditional notions of
sovereignty-a value that may be resurgent among rising powers and
in the international system generally. 14 2 Another possibility is that
being deferential toward states could cost the ICC legitimacy by
making it look like a puppet of states parties-a criticism that might
be particularly salient with the ICC's most ardent backers, European
states concerned with ending impunity. The level of deference that
may be accorded to states parties in future-admissibility proceedings
thus remains unclear.
The other axis the Court would have to consider is how
thoroughly, regardless of how deferential it is to the Prosecutor or
states, it should integrate due process concerns into the analysis
under Article 17. The scholarly debate over the due process thesis is
inconclusive, so legitimacy-related considerations are likely to be
particularly salient here. From a legitimacy perspective, at least some

Rome Statute, supra note 1, art. 19.
141.
142.
See generally William W. Burke-White, Power Shifts in InternationalLaw:
Structural Realignment and Substantive Pluralism (Pub. Law and Legal Theory
Research Paper Series, Paper No. 14-2, 2014), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/
sol3/papers.cfm?abstract id=2378912 [http://perma.cc/3QEQ-DWCE] (archived Jan. 15,
2015) (discussing the emphasis placed on sovereignty and participation by rising
powers).
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consideration of international due process factors is likely the optimal
risk-averse option because it minimizes the likelihood of the Court
being exposed to a situation that would result in a large loss of
legitimacy. In the domestic law context, scholars have noted that
judges crafting rules of decision are incented to behave in risk-averse,
reputation-conserving ways.14 3 If the Court developed a firm rule that
it could not consider international due process considerations under
Article 17, there would be an extant possibility that at some point, a
country would indicate its intent to subject an ICC indictee to a true
show trial and the ICC would be forced to give that state its
imprimatur. Such an event could have profound consequences to the
Court's legitimacy.144 By contrast, an indefinite standard that leaves
room for the ICC to consider certain international due process norms
would give the court a safety valve fully within its own control;
potential show trials could be averted regardless of the state of the
domestic law of the country challenging admissibility. Perhaps such a
regime would expose the court to criticisms that it is venturing
outside its core competency but from the perspective of a risk-averse,
legitimacy-concerned pool of judges, 145 the potential risk of such
criticisms likely would be much lower than the alternative.
If, as this Article has argued, the ICC does have strong
incentives to retain some due process considerations as part of the
Article 17 inquiry, the Court would also have strong incentives to
engage in predictive analysis. As discussed above, the vast majority of
admissibility challenges will come while domestic proceedings are
still in their nascent stages and will constitute the last word on the
admissibility of the case at issue. If the Court accepts due process
considerations as part of the Article 17 inquiry, it would be very
difficult for the Court to analyze whether the state is sufficiently
abiding by those norms at an early stage if it is only looking at a
state's past and present behavior. For example, how could the PreTrial Chamber analyze whether the state in question is respecting
the right to call witnesses in one's defense if the domestic proceeding
is nowhere near the point where witnesses would be called? Again, in

143.
See Raymond J. McKoski, Judicial Discipline and the Appearance of
Impropriety: What the Public Sees is What the Public Gets, 94 MINN. L. REV. 1914, 1958
n.237 (2010) ("Commentators often characterize judges as risk-averse."); Donald P.
Judges, Of Rocks and Hard Places: The Value of Risk Choice, 42 EMORY L.J. 1, 82
(1993) (asserting that "judges ... by temperament are likely to be risk averse").
144.
Given that many of the court's strongest supporters are countries with firm
commitments to international human rights, the ICC's signing off on a true "show
trial" would have the potential to profoundly damage support for the court amongst its
most ardent supporters. Possible results could include reductions in funding or
decreased support for the Court in the UN decision making apparatus.
See, e.g., Migret & Samson, supra note 41, at 573 (asserting that the ICC
145.
should only find a case admissible when "certain human rights violation [occur that] go
to the heart of whether a state is actually willing or able to carry out a trial at all").
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this situation, the optimal strategy from a risk-averse, legitimacyprotecting standpoint is to engage in predictive analysis of whether
due process would be granted by the domestic court because such
analysis would the best way to minimize the likelihood of the ICC
giving its blessing to a deeply flawed proceeding.
Use of predictive analysis is also preferable from a legitimacy
standpoint because it offers more flexibility than would an approach
tied to a state's performance up till the point of the admissibility
challenge. Were the Court to adopt an approach that did not
incorporate predictive analysis, it likely would be forced to measure
state performance against set benchmarks that could be awkward to
apply to the full variety of situations before the court. By contrast, a
predictive approach-because it allows the Court leeway to consider
subjective factors bearing on future performance-would help the
Court avoid rote, artificial due process rules. Finally, the legitimacy
costs to the Court of engaging in predictive analysis are manageable
because the line between (nominally prohibited) predictive analysis
and inferences from existing evidence is so thin and because there is
much jurisprudence throughout international law on how to integrate
due process considerations regarding domestic proceedings into the
decision making of international tribunals (see infra, Part V).
Thus, the sort of behavior described in Part III.B(iv) should come
as no surprise. It is likely that the Court is attempting to protect its
legitimacy by engaging in the kind of analysis least likely to cause
long-term damage to the institution.

IV. IMPLICATIONS OF PREDICTIVE DUE PROCESS

Part III of this Article argued that the ICC is moving toward a
due process-aware assessment of the domestic legal systems of states
challenging admissibility and that, as part of that model, the Court is
making predictive judgments about the capacity of states to prosecute
offenders. Accepting this conclusion as true, this Part assesses the
implications of the ICC's evolving complementarity jurisprudence and
offers some normative prescriptions for the Court's leaders. Some
commentators may bemoan that by engaging in substantive analysis
of the capacity and willingness of states to abide by due process
norms, the ICC 'isks moving beyond its core competency into an area
best suited for human rights tribunals. 146 Some ICC decisions have
reflected this concern as well.

146.
See Mdgret & Samson, supra note 41, at 578 ("The ICC was not established
or designed to provide an antidote to domestic violations of due process. Such violations
fall under the bailiwick of international human rights courts . . . ."); Benzing, supra
note 96, at 598 (arguing that the ICC was not created to function as a human rights
tribunal); see also Trahan, supra note 12, at 586 (noting that the ICC was not intended
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However, this criticism reveals an unintended point. If, for
reasons of institutional legitimacy, the ICC is going to dabble in the
domain of assessing the capacity of foreign legal systems, it may as a
result face second-order legitimacy problems as some states doubt
their ability to engage in the usual business of human rights
tribunals. That being the case, the ICC should learn from the
practices of these other tribunals when making complementarity
decisions. In fact, there is a thriving jurisprudence, existent in many
international legal bodies, of international courts evaluating domestic
legal systems and the likelihood that those legal systems will take
particular actions in the future. By drawing on the lessons of this
jurisprudence, the ICC stands to mitigate the potentially negative
effects of predictive evaluation of domestic legal systems.14 7
Before proceeding further, it is worth articulating the criticisms
of the ICC as arbiter of the quality of domestic legal proceedings so as
to understand the problems that need to be addressed. Roughly
speaking, the criticisms break down into two categories. The first
category of criticism is epistemological: the ability of the ICC to reach
correct decisions about whether states can and will uphold due
process norms in domestic proceedings may be weak or, at least, weak
enough such that the issue would be better left to human rights
tribunals.1 4 8 These criticisms certainly have some merit. ICC judges
are not necessarily steeped in the law of due process and human
rights and the Court's procedural format may not be optimized to

to serve as a "supra-national" appeals court for domestic legal systems); Jens David
Ohlin, A Meta-Theory of International Criminal Procedure: Vindicating the Rule of
Law, 14 UCLA J. INT'L L. & FOREIGN AFF. 77, 105 (2009) (noting that the ICC "works
retroactively to vindicate the Rule of Law" due to its "institutional design").
147.
See supra Part III. There is a link between the legitimacy concerns
discussed in Part III that may be motivating the Court's move toward predictive due
process analysis, and the legitimacy concerns discussed in the Part-which are arising
as a consequence of the ICC's move toward such analysis. This Part is framed
principally in normative terms: that the ICC should mitigate these second-order
legitimacy concerns by drawing on the jurisprudence of outside tribunals. However, it
is possible to understand this Part's argument as another leg of the descriptive
argument made in Part III.C: the Court has the proper incentives to move toward
predictive due process analysis in part because it has so much jurisprudence to draw
from other Courts. This paper frames the argument normatively largely because
second order legitimacy concerns have not fully developed, so it makes more sense to
speak prescriptively in terms of how they may be avoided. Additionally, it is likely the
case that the second order legitimacy concerns discussed in this Part are less serious
than the concerns discussed in Part III, so the existence of solutions to the second order
concerns may not be necessary for the descriptive argument made in Part III.C to
remain valid.
148.
As Professor Elinor Fry explains, "[I]t must be an extremely difficult task
for the Court to determine whether a violation of due process rights took place to the
benefit or the detriment of the accused." Fry, supra note 41, at 43.
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address questions related to state capacity. After all, the ICC was
designed as a forum to try individual criminal defendants.1 49
The second category is criticisms related to legitimacy.
Circulating throughout the discourse on complementarity and due
process is the idea that if the ICC dives too deeply into analysis of
domestic legal systems and their propensity to provide due process it
risks alienating the domestic states by sending a didactic or even
imperialistic message. 5 0 Professor Almqvist articulates the critique:
[Gliven the absence of a common standard and the fact that a national
settlement is not the manifestation of a haphazard or coincidental
series of events, but rather the upshot of a national understanding of
justice, an outside intervention (in this case an international judicial
intervention) could be seen as an arbitrary attack on settled national
judicial arrangements and an affront to the beliefs that underlie and
15
shape them. 1

As discussed in Part III.C, legitimacy is a slippery concept and
precisely what kind of jurisprudence will maximize stakeholder buyin to the ICC likely is an unanswerable question. However, there is
anecdotal evidence that intensive ICC analysis of domestic state
investigations can have pernicious effects on perceptions of the ICC
within those states. For example, President Uhuru Kenyatta
successfully used resentment against the ICC investigation in Kenya,
and its rejection of Kenya's admissibility challenge, to fuel his
successful bid for reelection.1 5 2
The remainder of this Part analyzes in turn three distinct areas
of law in which courts have had to evaluate the competence of other
courts to carry out proceedings. In each of these areas, courts have,
like the ICC, been forced to engage in predictive analysis of whether
the legal system being analyzed would, hypothetically, provide some
guarantee. The three case studies are 11 bis proceedings in the ICTY,
the experience of international trade and investment law with

149.
This criticism is also particularly salient to the extent that the ICC is
engaging in predictive analysis of what a state will or will not do.
150.
See Elena Baylis, Reassessing the Role of International Criminal Law:
Rebuilding National Courts through TransnationalNetworks, 50 B.C. L. REV. 1, 12-13
(2009) (arguing that, as a general matter, the decisions of international tribunals suffer
from legitimacy, deficits in the states where atrocities occurred as compared to the
decisions of local courts); Gregory S. McNeal, supra note 12, at 349-50 (noting that it
will be difficult for the ICC to provide technical assistance and capacity-building
support to developing countries if "there is a perception that very few domestically
constituted tribunals can meet the standards necessary to preclude ICC jurisdiction").
151.
Almqvist, supra note 35, at 352-53.
152.
See Geoffrey Mosoku, How Pair Defied International Criminal Court
Rhetoric to Clinch Win, STANDARD DIGITAL (Mar. 3, 2014), http1/www.standardmedia.co
.kelarticlelD=2000105904&story-title-how-pair-defied-ice-rhetoric-to-linch-win [http/permacel
EDD9-WLXC] (archived Jan. 15, 2015) (discussing how Uhuru Kenyatta and William
Ruto formed a political alliance based on resentment of the ICC). See generally
Chandra Lekha Sriram & Stephen Brow, Kenya in the Shadow of the ICC:
Complementarity, Gravity and Impact, 12 INT'L CRIM. L. REV. 219 (2012).
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variable standards of review, and the proportionality jurisprudence of
international and regional human rights bodies. From each study,
this Article briefly draws parallels and lessons that can inform how
the ICC should go about adjudicating admissibility challenges when
due process concerns are an issue. The aim of these case studies is not
to provide an exhaustive listing of all that the ICC can draw from
other legal systems in the context of complementarity, but rather to
show, by way of example, that the ICC can and should-in a manner
consistent with the Rome Statute-draw from other legal systems
when it must analyze due process considerations as part of
complementarity challenges.
A. The InternationalCriminal Tribunalfor the Former Yugoslavia,
Rule 11 Bis, and The Need for Special Panels and Post-Decision
Monitoring
Likely the best analogy to Article 17 litigation in the ICC is the
ICTY's experience with Article 11 bis. Article 11 bis of the ICTY's
Rules of Procedure and Evidence permits the Tribunal to transfer
certain defendants that have already been indicted in the ICTY to
states parties for domestic trial, provided certain criteria are met.1 58
Since the UN Security Council directed the ICTY to concentrate on
high-level offenders, transfers under 11 bis have become an
important strategy used by the Tribunal to free up resources and
speed completion of the Tribunal's mandate.' 5 4 Since transfers began,
a relatively elaborate jurisprudence has built up around when and
how an 11 bis petition is evaluated.
Eleven bis petitions may be initiated either by the prosecution or
directly by the Tribunal. Because the ICTY operates under the
principle of primacy, transfers are always discretionary. After an 11
bis proceeding has been initiated, it is heard by a special panel of
three permanent ICTY judges known as the referral bench.155 The
members of the referral bench are appointed by the Tribunal's
president and need not be the same from case to case.15 6 However, to

&

153.
See International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia, Rules of
Procedure and Evidence, IT/32/Rev. 44, Rule 11 bis (adopted Dec. 10, 2009) [hereinafter
ICTY Rules of Procedure and Evidence], http://www.icty.org/x/file/Legal%20Library/
Rules-procedureevidence/ITO32_rev44 en.pdf. [http://perma.ccL2Z8-TGLJ] (archived
Jan. 15, 2015).
154.
See Susan Somers, Rule 11 Bis of the International Criminal Tribunal for
the Former Yugoslavia: Referral of Indictments to National Courts, 30 B.C. INT'L
COMP. L. REV. 175, 176 (2007).
155.
See id. at 177.
156.
See Olympia Bekou, Rule 11 Bis: An Examination of the Process of Referrals
to National Courts in ICTY Jurisprudence,33 FORDHAM INT'L L.J. 723, 731 (2010).
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date, the members of the referral bench generally have remained the
same.1 5 7
In deciding whether to make a referral, the referral bench
considers a series of factors. First, in accordance with the text of 11
bis, the panel considers the "gravity of the crimes charged and the
level of responsibility of the accused,"15 8 the idea being that more
serious crimes are more appropriately handled by the Tribunal
itself.15 9 Once it has determined a case is appropriate for referral, the
referral bench assesses where the case ought to be referred. Under
Rule 11 bis(A)(iii), the Tribunal can transfer a case to, inter alia, a
state that "[has] jurisdiction and [is] willing and adequately prepared
to accept such a case."16 0 Although 11 bis permits the Tribunal to
transfer cases to states where the accused committed crimes or was
found, even if (A)(iii) is not satisfied, in practice the referral bench
regards due process as a basic component of the test for whether a
case will be transferred to a particular state. In the words of Susan
Somers, a former ICTY prosecutor, "the Bench must be satisfied that
the accused will receive a fair trial and that the death penalty will
not be imposed or carried out."1 61 Because in any 11 bis proceeding
the domestic legal system will not have initiated proceedings against
the accused, the ICTY's analysis is inherently prospective. As must
the ICC in the complementarity context, the Tribunal must assess the
capacity of the domestic state and makes predictive judgments about
what it may or may not do with respect to the accused's trial.
Most 11 bis decisions follow a fairly set pattern with respect to
due process. In Mejakic, an influential referral decision, the panel
identified a list of factors critical to due process.1 62 These included a
presumption of innocence, an impartial tribunal, a right to legal

157.
See id.; William W. Burke-White, The Domestic Influence of International
Criminal Tribunals: The International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia
and the Creation of the State Court of Bosnia & Herzegovina, 46 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L
L. 279, 326-27 (2008).
158.
ICTY Rules of Procedure and Evidence, supra note 153.
159.
See id.
160.
Id. As other commentators have noted, this language bears a striking
resemblance to Article 17 of the Rome Statute and, indeed, was likely influenced by the
Rome Statute, given that it was added to the ICTY Statute in 2004. See Bekou, supra
note 156, at 758-59.
161.
Somers, supra note 154, at 183; see also Rocio Dig6n, Recent Development,
The Stankovic Decisions of the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former
Yugoslavia, 31 YALE J. INT'L L. 281, 282 (2006) ("The Referral Bench will authorize a
Rule 11 his transfer only if it has received assurances that 'the accused will receive a
fair trial and that the death penalty will not be imposed or carried out .
(citation
omitted)).
162.
See Prosecutor v. Mejakid, Gruban, Fuitar & Kneievik, Case No. IT-02-65PT, Decision on Prosecutor's Motion for Referral of Case Pursuant to Rule 11 bis, 1 68
(Int'l Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia July 20, 2005) [hereinafter Mejakic
Referral Decision] (stating eleven factors that should be considered requirements for a
fair trial).
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counsel, a right to call and examine witnesses, and a right not to be
compelled to self-incriminate.' 6 3 In most cases, the panel recalls these
factors, then cross-references them against the criminal code of the
country to which the accused is to be transferred and determines if
there are any significant gaps.' 64 The panel typically does not engage
in extensive analysis of whether these guarantees actually are
implemented in the state's criminal justice system or of whether they
are likely to be extended to the accused. The vast majority of 11 bis
decisions to date have found the state being considered for trying the
accused to be an acceptable forum. However, the Tribunal typically
orders the Prosecutor to monitor and report back on the domestic
proceedings and it reserves the right to revoke the order and bring
the case back to the ICTY.' 6 s
The ICTY's experience with 11 bis holds potentially important
lessons for the ICC. First, the leaders of the ICC should consider
appointing a special standing panel to hear complementarity
challenges. Like the ICTY's referral bench, this panel should be
composed of a select group of ICC judges that does not change
regularly. From an epistemologicallaccuracy
standpoint, the
advantages of this arrangement are obvious. A group of judges that
consistently hears admissibility challenges will have a better sense of
what sort of evidence is probative of a serious due process concern (or
a serious shielding concern), and its Article 17 jurisprudence is likely
to be more consistent than that of the regular Pre-Trial Chamber.1 66

163.
See id.
164.
See, e.g., Prosecutor v. Kovatevid, Case No. IT-01-42/2-I, Decision on
Referral of Case Pursuant to Rule 11bis, T 68 (Int'l Crim. Trib. for the Former
Yugoslavia Nov. 17, 2006) (listing "the requirements of a fair criminal trial");
Prosecutor v. Jankovid, Case No. IT-96-23/2-PT, Decision on Referral of Case Under
Rule 11 Bis, T 62 (Int'l Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia July 22, 2005) (listing
"the requirement[s] of a fair criminal trial"); Prosecutor v. Rahevid & Todovid, Case No.
IT-97-25/1-PT, Decision on Referral of Case Under Rule 11 Bis with Confidential
Annexes I and II, ¶ 72 (Int'l Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslivia July 8, 2005) (same);
Prosecutor v. Stankovi6, Case No, IT-96-23/2-PT, Decision on Referral of Case Under
Rule 11 Bis, ¶ 55 (Int'l Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia May 17, 2005) (same); see
also, e.g., Somers, supra note 154, at 182 (footnote omitted) (quoting Mejaki6 Referral
Decision, supra note 162, T 43) ("The Referral Bench must be satisfied that 'if the case
were to be referred to Bosnia and Herzegovina, there would exist an adequate legal
framework which not only criminalizes the alleged conduct of the Accused, but which
also provides for appropriate punishment."').
165.
See Somers, supranote 154, at 182-83.
166.
It is often argued by public and administrative law scholars that, in the
adjudicative context, decision-makers who make the same kinds of decisions with a
high frequency are often more competent in making those decisions than generalists
who make the kind of decision in question at a lower frequency. See Harold H. Bruff,
Specialized Courts in Administrative Law, 43 ADMIN. L. REV. 329, 330 (1991)
(concluding that "more accurate decisions should result" from the fact that "specialized
judges can become expert in the substantive and procedural issues surrounding
particular programs"); Richard L. Revesz, Specialized Courts and the Administrative
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A specialized complementarity panel could also increase the
legitimacy of complementarity decisions amongst states partiesparticularly states that have or are considering making
complementarity challenges. Increased consistency, which would
likely come from a standing panel, would likely decrease perceptions
of bias.1 67
Second, the ICC might benefit from employing a formalized
observer system, similar to that used by the ICTY after referral cases.
As discussed in Part III.C, part of what likely is driving the ICC's
predictive jurisprudence under Article 17 is the fact that it is very
difficult for the Court to revisit complementarity decisions once they
have been made. 168 Were the ICC to adopt a system where the
Prosecutor (or some other organ of the Court) was obligated to send
representatives to observe and report on domestic proceedings after a
complementarity decision has been made, it might take some
pressure off of the Pre-Trial Chamber to make precise judgments
about whether domestic proceedings will be both legitimate and
sufficiently fair to the accused. If the Prosecutor uncovered evidence
that the domestic proceeding was straying outside acceptable bounds,
the Court could reopen admissibility proceedings. Though the Rome
Statute does not provide for such a system, the ICTY Statute did not
stipulate an observer system, and the system created in that tribunal
was never held impermissible. Moreover, given its longstanding
emphasis on "positive complementarity,"1 69 performing such an
activity would not be too far outside the core competency of the OTP.
Implementing a system of OPT oversight of domestic
prosecutions would require doctrinal innovation, but the Rome Statue
likely could support such a move. As discussed in Part III.C, the
Rome Statute Article 19 permits subsequent challenges to
complementarity only in "exceptional circumstances" (without
defining the meaning of that term). To properly implement an 11 bis
Lawmaking System, 138 U. PA. L. REV. 1111, 1117 (1990) (suggesting that "specialized
courts are more likely to make correct decisions in complex areas").
167.
The relationship between consistency of decision making and perceptions of
bias is again frequently noted in public law scholarship. See, e.g., Yoav Dotan, Making
Consistency Consistent, 57 ADMIN. L. REV. 995, 1000 (2005) (noting that consistency is
"fundamental to the notions of prompt administrative order, rationality in
administrative decisionmaking, and impartiality in adjudicative proceedings").
168.
See supra Part III.C.
169.
The ICC and scholars of the Court have long emphasized the Court's
important role in encouragement of domestic prosecutions (although the OTP has at
times been hesitant to become involved in direct capacity building). See OFFICE OF THE
PROSECUTOR, INT'L CRIMINAL COURT, PROSECUTORIAL STRATEGY 2009-2012 5 (2010),

http://www.ice-cpi.intlNR/rdonlyres/66A8DCDC-3650-4514-AA62-D229D1128F65/281506/OTP
ProsecutorialStrategy20092013.pdf [http://perma.cclY8BN-X9FU] (archived Jan. 15, 2015)
(footnote omitted) (emphasizing that the OTP "will encourage genuine national
proceedings where possible, including in situation countries, including in situation
countries, relying on its various networks of cooperation"); Burke-White, supra note
131, at 67-68 (arguing that the ICC should actively assist domestic states in
undertaking domestic prosecutions of individuals accused of international crimes).
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style model of continuing evaluation of state behavior after a
successful complementarity challenge, the Court would need to define
this term broadly such that due process concerns expressed by ICC
monitors could be enough to trigger a subsequent complementarity
challenge. The Appeals Chamber in Senussi seemed to support such a
development, noting that the failure of a state to appoint a lawyer for
the accused "may be a basis for the Prosecutor to seek, pursuant to
Article 19(10) of the Statute, a review of the decision."' 7 0
Additionally, the Court may need to develop standards that clarify
the OTP's institutional role when observing domestic prosecutions
(perhaps clarifying that the OTP in this context has a responsibility
to provide objective information to the Court, even if the Office holds
a specific position on whether domestic prosecution of the case at
issue should be allowed).
B. InternationalEconomic Law and Variable Standardsof Review
If the ICC adopts an 11 bis-style system-wherein it presupposes
a state's ability to try the accused but retains the ability to reinstitute
an ICC case should the domestic effort falter-it will need additional
principles to guide its initial grant of deference to states. How much
initial leeway should the ICC grant to prosecuting states, both with
respect to the baseline legal due process standards they must meet
and as to how states' factual claims should be evaluated in
complementarity litigation? Other branches of international law,
particularly international economic law, have much guidance to offer
in these areas.
International economic law has developed a range of doctrines
that allow tribunals to defer to the judgments of domestic courts in
certain circumstances but not others. Standards of deference are
perhaps best developed in international trade law and the
jurisprudence of the World Trade Organization (WTO) Appellate
Body (AB). The WTO hears cases brought by states against other
states alleging violations of international trade law. Frequently, cases
heard by the WTO and the AB may involve the permissibility of a
regulatory action on the part of one state alleged to give it an unfair
trade advantage vis A vis the other state: for example, whether a
particular tariff or subsidy is permissible under international trade
law. The standard of review in most WTO disputes is governed
officially by Article 11 of the Understanding on Rules and Procedures
Governing the Settlement of Disputes,171 which provides that "a
panel should make an objective assessment of the matter before it,

170.
Judgment on Appeal of Al-Senussi, supra note 88, ¶ 201.
171.
General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade art. 11, Apr. 15, 1994, 1867
U.N.T.S. 187.
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including an objective assessment of the facts of the case and the
applicability of and conformity with the relevant covered
agreements."1 7 2 This text, like many international legal texts dealing
with standards of review, is ambiguous. Does an "objective
assessment" necessarily imply a de novo assessment, or does it leave
room for deference to certain state determinations of fact or, perhaps,
law?
Since the founding of the WTO, the AB has elaborated a
jurisprudence that affords deference to states, but only in certain
situations that accord with the broader goals of the underlying legal
instruments the AB interprets. Dean Andrew Guzman has
characterized
the
AB's
jurisprudence
on
standards
of
review/deference as follows: the AB "must balance the advantages
that the domestic government has [in procuring information relevant
to the tribunal] against concerns about sham use of the [relevant
agreement] to achieve protectionism."1 7 3 Guzman's fear of the "sham
use" of trade agreements is telling; to the extent that his
characterization of AB jurisprudence is normative, it is motivated in
part by a desire to protect the legitimacy of the WTO dispute
resolution mechanism (along with a reciprocal desire to maximize the
accuracy of WTO judgments).
Guzman and other scholars have noted that the amount of
deference state litigants receive in WTO litigation varies depending
on the situation. The WTO tends to give little to no deference on pure
75
issues of law, 174 the meaning of "objective evidence,"s
and on
procedural analysis of state decision making (whether the state
considered "all relevant factors" in making a decision, for example).' 7 6
However, the AB tends to give substantial deference to the
conclusions reached by states in narrow or technical areas of fact.1 77
For example, in a 2001 case, the WTO was tasked with assessing
whether there was sufficient evidence to conclude there was a risk to
human health (the existence of which would have justified state
regulatory action designed to mitigate health risk, at issue in the
case).' 7 8 Although the state defendant's scientific evidence suggesting
there was a health risk appeared to be representative of a minority of

&

172.
Id.
173.
Andrew T. Guzman, Determining the Appropriate Standard of Review in
WTO Disputes, 42 CORNELL INT'L L.J. 45, 68 (2009).
174.
See id. at 58-60 ("The WTO itself is the key source of expertise with respect
to pure questions of law.").
Id. at 62-64.
175.
176.
Id. at 60-62.
177.
See id. at 70; see also Valentina Vadi & Lukasz Gruszczynski, Standardsof
Review in InternationalInvestment Law and Arbitration: Multilevel Governance and
the Commonweal, 16 J. INT'L EcON. L. 613, 629 (2013).
178.
See Panel Report, European Communities - Measures Affecting Asbestos
and Asbestos-Containing Products, ¶ 8.1888, W/T/DS135/R (Apr. 5, 2001); Vadi
Gruszczynski, supra note 177.
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the scientific community, the panel accepted the evidence as
sufficient.17 9 In Guzman's account, a deferential standard for such
evidence makes sense because the relative capacity of the state to
engage in sophisticated scientific analysis is comparatively high vis A
vis the WTO. 8 0
The jurisprudence on deference in international investment law
is less refined than in the trade context but reflects similar concerns
about institutional capacity. Frequently, when investors sue states
under bilateral investment treaties (BITs), arbitral tribunals are
forced to evaluate the legitimacy of decisions that were the product of
state regulatory, legislative proceedings. In cases involving denial of
justice claims, they may even sit as quasi-appellate bodies evaluating
the legitimacy of state judicial proceedings. 18 ' Yet neither the ICSID
Convention nor most BITs specify the kind of standard of review that
tribunals should apply. In recent years, a large number of scholars
have filled this gap by arguing that tribunals should apply deferential
standards of review in situations where the competency of the state is
high as compared to the tribunal, or in situations where particular
sovereign interests are involved. 8 2 Though this academic common
wisdom has not entered fully into the doctrine, ICSID tribunals have
evinced a willingness to defer when confronted with an issue where
the state clearly has a higher capacity than the tribunal. For
example, in Chemtura Corp. v. Canada, the tribunal noted when
determining the standard of review that it should not "second-guess

179.
See Vadi & Gruszczynski, supra note 177.
180.
See Guzman, supra note 173, at 69 ("WTO Panels and the AB are quite ill
equipped to engage in review of scientific judgments by member states."). Factual
questions that turn on sovereign policy choices receive similar deference. For example,
state determinations of unacceptable risk (say, to human health) are evaluated
deferentially because a "determination of the appropriate level of protection ... is a
prerogative of the [state]." Id. at 70-71.
181.
See, e.g., Loewen Group, Inc. v. United States, ICSID Case No.
ARB(AF)/98/3, Award (June 26, 2003), http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/
22094.pdf [http://perma.cclFPG5-HUBW] (archived Feb. 7, 2015) (evaluating a denial of
justice claim in which a Canadian investor alleged mistreatment at the hands of
Mississippi state courts).
182.
See, e.g., Stephan W. Schill, Deference in Investment Treaty Arbitration:ReConceptualizing the Standard of Review through ComparativePublic Law 15-16 (Soc'y
of Int'l & Econ. Law Working Paper No. 2012/33) (" [B] oth the public international roots
and the domestic public law function should shape the criteria influencing how much
deference investment treaty tribunals should accord to acts of host states within a
separation of powers framework"); William. Burke-White & Andreas von Staden,
Private Litigation in a Public Law Sphere: The Standard of Review in Investor State
Arbitrations, 35 YALE J. INT'L L. 283, 286 (2010) (proposing a change in standard of
review that "will be, at times, more deferential to states' public law regulatory
choices").
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the correctness of the science-based decision-making of highly
specialized national regulatory agencies."18 3
Although none of the doctrines described in this subpart involve
explicitly predictive analysis, the development of standards of review
in private international law is highly relevant to ICC's work on
complementarity. If the ICC is to refer to due process standards when
the
it could
both increase
evaluating
complementarity,
epistemological accuracy of its decision making and increase
legitimacy among states parties by varying the amount of deference it
grants to states challenging complementarity. The guiding principle
in international economic law-that the international tribunal should
exercise more deference when evaluating an area of particular state
competence-can be transplanted to the due process/complementarity
context. For example, when evaluating state claims that the state is
providing a defendant with due process, the ICC could and should
adopt looser standards of review when the legal question at issue is
dependent on the unique context of the state's judicial system.
Consider, for instance, a situation in which the state has failed to
provide the defendant with a lawyer. If the state justifies this
outcome by arguing that defendants in its judicial system do not need
lawyers because the state uses an inquisitorial-rather than an
adversarial-system of adjudication, this argument should perhaps
be evaluated with some degree of deference because the state is
uniquely positioned to evaluate the needs of defendants in its judicial
system. 184 But if the state's argument were based on a lack of
capacity (as was the case in the Libya litigation), deference would not
be warranted. The use of this kind of deference could also help blunt
criticism from some states that the Court is insufficiently respectful
of sovereign attempts to manage their internal affairs (a criticism

183.
Chemtura Corp. v. Canada, UNCITRAL, Award, T 134 (Aug. 2, 2010),
available at http://www.international.gc.caltrade-agreements-accords-commerciaux/assets/
pdfs/disp-diff/chemtura-14.pdf [http://perma.cc/ZYC7-UPYV] (archived Feb. 7, 2015).
Similarly, tribunals suggested a stronger willingness to apply a deferential standard
when confronted with a state decision that was obviously the product of a
comparatively thorough decision making process. See Frontier Petroleum Services Ltd.
v. Czech Republic, UNCITRAL, Final Award, ¶ 529 (Nov. 12, 2010), available at
httpJ/www.italaw.com/sites/defaultifiles/case-documents/ita0342.pdf [http://perma.cc/P6WU2V9J] (archived Jan. 15, 2015) (providing a measure of deference to the respondent
state after noting that the claimant's arguments "were entertained by four levels of
courts and [that] the Claimant had several opportunities to submit legal arguments");
Saluka Investments B.V. v. Czech Republic, UNCITRAL, Partial Award, ¶ 264 (Mar.
17, 2006), available at http://www.pca-cpa.org/showpage.asp?pag-id=1149 [http://perma.cc/
GHQ8-LQUU] (archived Jan. 15, 2015) ("The context within which an impugned
measure is adopted and applied is critical to the determination of its validity.").
184.
Obviously, this sort of deference would have limits and it could not be
allowed to develop into a system where states make arguments in bad faith designed to
yield a deferential standard of review. Given the highly public nature of ICC
challenges, however, it seems likely that the Court would be able to weed out such
challenges.
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that would likely increase in volume if the ICC ever explicitly
incorporated human rights norms into its complementarity
jurisprudence).
C. InternationalHuman Rights Tribunalsand the Uses of
Proportionality
Finally, if the ICC is to engage in analysis of the due process
protections of domestic legal systems, it should look for guidance to
the courts that routinely adjudicate questions of whether a domestic
legal system measures up to international standards. Such decisions
are most commonly made by regional human rights tribunals, such as
the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) and the InterAmerican Court of Human Rights. These courts do not typically
engage in predictive analysis of the sort that may be necessitated by
the Rome Statute, but more than any other judicial body they are
tasked with analyzing domestic legal structures in the context of
broad international norms. To the extent that substantive standards
of international due process exist, it is because of the jurisprudence of
human rights courts. Given this role, human rights tribunals have
developed sophisticated doctrines that give content to international
due process norms and balance states' legitimate sovereign interests
against nearly universal individual rights. A full explanation of what
the ICC can learn from human rights jurisprudence is beyond the
scope of this Article. Thus, the aim of this subpart is again
demonstrative: to show one way Article 17 determinations could gain
content from human rights jurisprudence and suggest avenues for
future research. Also, before continuing, it is worth noting that under
current ICC doctrine, explicit importation of human rights norms is
largely forbidden. The suggestions that follow are thus more longterm recommendations for how the ICC's doctrine should evolve.
Many of the most contentious cases brought before regional
human rights bodies involve the permissibility of state restrictions on
rights enumerated by treaty. For example, can the right to Freedom
of Assembly and Association guaranteed by Article 11 of the
European Convention on Human Rights' 85 be burdened by a
restriction on rallies by racist groups? 86 Because the guarantees in
human rights instruments are typically phrased in universalist
terms,18 7 the challenge for human rights tribunals lies in conducting

185.
See European Convention on Human Rights art. 11, Nov. 5, 1950, 213
U.N.T.S. 221 [hereinafter ECHR] ("Everyone has the right to freedom of peaceful
assembly and to freedom of association with others.").
186.
See Vona v. Hungary, App. No. 35943/10, Judgment, Eur. Ct. H.R. (July 9,
2013).
187.
See, e.g., International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights art. 12, Mar.
23, 1976, 999 U.N.T.S. 171 ("Everyone lawfully within the territory of a State shall,
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a limitations analysis-that is, finding a way to balance a state's
legitimate sovereign prerogative to enact policies to benefit the
country as a whole against the value of the individual right at issue.
Many courts and tribunals conduct this sort of analysis with
reference to the principle of proportionality. In a proportionalitycentric analysis, the Court looks at the underlying purpose of the
state action and assesses whether the resulting burden on the right
at issue is proportionate to that purpose. 8 8 According to Professor T.
Jeremy Gunn, courts engaging in proportionality analysis typically
use a structured inquiry: the court examines the objective of the
challenged state action and the seriousness of the underlying
motivation, the effects of the action on the right at issue, and, finally,
the significance of the right being limited before reaching a
decision. 8 9 The result is a flexible standard that grants states more
leeway to limit rights when they are facing emergencies or other
exigencies. Proportionality-style analysis is common in the
jurisprudence of the ECtHR, the European Court of Justice,19 0 and
various domestic constitutional courts, and analogs exist in U.S.
public law.' 9
Much has been written about the benefits, drawbacks, and
development of proportionality. In particular, scholars have tried to
within that territory, have the right to liberty of movement and freedom to choose his
residence."); ECHR, supra note 185, arts. 5, 9 (providing that "[e]veryone has the right
to liberty and security of person" and that "[e]veryone has the right to freedom of
thought, conscience and religion").
188.
See, e.g., Otto-Preminger-Institut v. Austria, App. No. 13470/87, Judgment,
Eur. Ct. H.R., 1 49 (Sept. 20, 1994) ("[I]t may be considered necessary in certain
democratic societies to sanction or even prevent improper attacks on objects of religious
veneration, provided always that any 'formality', 'condition', 'restriction' or 'penalty'
imposed be proportionate to the legitimate aim pursued."); Juridicial Condition and
Rights of Undocumented Migrants, Advisory Opinion OC-18/03, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R., ¶
119 (Sept. 17, 2003), available at http://www.corteidh.or.cr/docs/opiniones/seriea_18_ing.pdf
[http://perma.cc/58N4-CG5B] (archived Jan. 15, 2015) ("[T]he state may grant a
distinct treatment to documented migrants with respect to undocumented migrants, or
between migrants and nationals, provided that this differential treatment is
reasonable, objective, proportionate and does not harm human rights.") (emphasis
added).
189.
See T. Jeremy Gunn, Deconstructing Proportionality in Limitations
Analysis, 19 EMORY INT'L L. REV. 465, 487-94 (2005).
190.
See id. 465-66.
191.
U.S. public law is generally considered more resistant to proportionality
analysis than the law of many other countries. However, various areas of U.S. law
incorporate proportionality principles. See Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319 (1976)
(establishing that in determining whether a litigant has been afforded procedural due
process, the court must look to "the private interest that will be affected by the official
action .. . the risk of an erroneous deprivation of such interest through the procedures
used. . . and finally, the government's interest, including the function involved and the
fiscal and administrative burdens"); see also E. THOMAS SULLIVAN & RICHARD S. FRASE,
PROPORTIONALITY PRINCIPLES IN AMERICAN LAw 5 (2009) ("The Supreme Court has

recently identified several areas of economic and social regulation that require
heightened scrutiny, and the Court has explicitly invoked proportionality principles.
These areas include the use of punitive damages, land-use permit conditions, civil
forfeitures, and criminal punishment.").
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account for proportionality's rapid expansion starting in the midtwentieth century. What advantages are driving courts' decisions to
adopt the doctrine? One answer sometimes put forward is that the
structure of the proportionality inquiry tracks many of the disputes
that arise in public law-both national and transnational.
As Professors Alec Stone Sweet and Jud Mathews have
explained, the classic conflict in public law jurisprudence is "one
between right X and a government action designed to facilitate the
development or enjoyment of right Y."1 9 2 A formalized balancing
framework, in this account, is the best way to fairly resolve these
disputes.' 93 One might also think that proportionality serves an
expressive function, separate from its utility as a way of correctly
resolving conflicts. If, in fact, most public law conflicts involve a
balancing of Right X against Right Y, proportionality analysis may be
attractive because it allows the court-which ultimately must decide
in favor of one of the two rights-to nonetheless acknowledge the
moral force of the right that must be abridged. Though such an
acknowledgment may come as little solace to the party on the losing
side of the case being decided, it may be important to other
stakeholders who value the losing right, both as an affirmation that
the right remains legally relevant and as a statement of the court's
commitment to reconciling competing values.
Notice that these advantages of proportionality are reciprocal to
the criticisms leveled at the ICC in the complementarity context.
Proportionality is a device that, at least arguably, can improve the
accuracy of decisions and help placate parties on the losing side of
controversial decisions; critics of the due process theory assert that
the ICC lacks the ability to enforce international norms accurately
and that attempting to do so would hurt the court's legitimacy. 194 The
absence of any kind of proportionality-based logic from the Article 17
inquiry is thus striking. When due process norms are at stake, the
unwillingness inquiry has much in common with the sort of
competing rights cases adjudicated by human rights tribunals. Take
the Libya situation as an example. When Saif Al-Islam and Abdullah
Al-Senussi opposed Libya's complementarity claims on due process
grounds, they were in a sense seeking to have their rights vindicated

192.
See Alec Stone Sweet & Jud Mathews, Proportionality Balancing and
Global Constitutionalism, 47 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 72, 91 (2008); see also Soering v.
United Kingdom, App. No. 14038/88, Judgment, Eur. Ct. H.R., 1 89 (July 7, 1989)
("[I]nherent in the whole of the Convention is a search for a fair balance between the
demands of the general interest of the community and the requirements of the
protection of the individual's fundamental rights.").
193.
See Stone Sweet & Mathews, supra note 192, at 91-92 ("Apart from
adopting a formal balancing framework such as PA, we do not see how a court could
position itself better to deal with such cases.").
194.
See supra text accompanying notes 148-51.
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under international human rights law. However, the international
rights to which Gaddafi and Senussi laid claim only have legal
content insofar as they can be balanced against Libya's sovereign
prerogative-that is, Libya's need to provide an adjudicatory system
to Gaddafi and Senussi that accounts for limited resources and the
need to provide critical government services to Libya's population.
Perhaps it is this lack of acknowledgment of the tradeoffs that
must be made that makes the Gaddafi and Senussi opinions so
unsettling to read. As discussed in Part III.B, it is apparent from both
Gaddafi and Senussi that the Court was concerned with due process
concerns and factored them into its decision in some capacity. Yet
none of the Court's opinions went so far as to account openly for
countervailing considerations: Libya's limited resources and, perhaps,
its desire to subject Gaddafi and Senussi to trials that would be
useful to the post-conflict reconciliation process. As a result, the
decisions made by the ICC feel incomplete. In both cases, it is unclear
what substantive standard the court used to determine that the ICC
case against Gaddafi was admissible and the case against Senussi
was not-or, indirectly, that Gaddafi's rights had been impermissibly
limited and Senussi's had not. In future admissibility challenges, the
use of proportionality doctrine might help alleviate this tension. In
cases where the ICC rejects states' complementarity challenges,
explicit acknowledgment of the sovereign rights being limited might
make the decision seem more legitimate to states parties. 9 5 Use of

195. Admittedly, there is an argument that the kind of process-oriented
legalization for which this Article advocates could hinder, rather than bolster
legitimacy. Perhaps, rather than acting as a salve for losing states, an ICC opinion that
systematically explained why a state's commitment to due process protections was
insufficient for it to try a notorious war criminal could actually inflame tensions
between that state an the ICC. If one accepts that argument over the one laid out by
this Article, then perhaps the lack of doctrinal rigor in the Libya decisions and their
future progeny is a cost that must be borne for the Court to preserve its legitimacy with
states parties.
The dichotomy between such a position and the one for which this Article advocates
is an example of a much larger normative schism in the law regarding the value of
institutionalization. Compare ALAN M. DERSHOWITZ, WHY TERRORISM WORKS (2002)
(arguing that because there is a high likelihood the U.S. government will torture
terrorism suspects, the law should sanction and regulate torture), with Oren Gross, Are
Torture Warrants Warranted? Pragmatic Absolutism and Official Disobedience, 88
MINN. L. REV. 1481, 1542-45 (2004) (arguing that even if U.S. officials are likely to
torture terrorism suspects, torture should not be institutionalized, in part, because the
result could be legitimization); compare also Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214,
242-48 (1944) (Jackson, J., dissenting) (arguing that executive detention of Japanese
Americans during wartime should not be given constitutional imprimatur, even if "[a]
military commander may overstep the bounds of constitutionality"), with Hamdi v.
Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507 (2004) (holding that detainees at Guantanao Bay, Cuba, must
be given the opportunity to challenge their designation as enemy combatants).
Although this Article cannot definitively address this criticism, it favors doctrinal
clarity and open discussion in ICC opinions of the concerns that animate the Court's
decisions. Institutionalization and procedural fairness are recurrent value throughout
public international law and are thought to contribute to international law's force and
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proportionality doctrine would also give the ICC the doctrinal
justification to adopt a flexible attitude toward admissibility
challenges that would acknowledge differences in circumstances
between states.1 96

V. CONCLUSION

The ICC's complementarity jurisprudence remains a work in
progress. Although the Gaddafi and Senussi decisions will likely
prove helpful in clarifying the role of due process considerations in
the complementarity analysis, the Court has yet to provide definitive
statements on the role of international norms and the kinds of factors
it should consider when evaluating challenges to the admissibility of
ICC cases. It is possible that a significant amount of time will pass
before the questions discussed in this Article are settled. After all, the
issue of overzealous domestic prosecutions that present due process
concerns has not, to date, arisen consistently in ICC cases. That said,
given the emphasis both inside the ICC and beyond on domestic state
prosecution of heinous international crimes, the issue of overzealous
state prosecutions and complementarity seems almost certain to arise
again. Thus, the questions asked in this Article will continue to
remain relevant for scholars and policymakers alike.
Because this Article was largely an exercise in reading between
the lines of recent decisions to make predictions about how the ICC
will evolve, the ultimate validity of its conclusions remains to be seen.
Though, in my view, the best way of understanding the Libya
decisions is that they signal the rise of predictive analysis, it is
possible that the decisions ultimately will not be influential because
of the unique political considerations associated with the ICC's work
in Libya. Nonetheless, the hope is that this Article has accomplished
two important tasks that will remain relevant regardless of the
ultimate disposition of due process and complementarity. First, it has
shown the importance of considering extra-doctrinal factors when
assessing the ICC jurisprudence on complementarity. Because of the
theoretical richness of the complementarity question, it is easy to
become lost in the intricacies of the doctrine and neglect the most
effectiveness. See, e.g., THOMAS M. FRANCK, FAIRNESS IN INTERNATIONAL LAW AND

INSTITUTIONS (1995) (arguing that states are most likely to obey international law
when they perceive it as legitimate, which is more likely when the law is coherent and
created through proper procedures). Rejecting these values in the hopes of protecting a
few states parties from embarrassment thus seems short-sighted and could make it
more difficult for the Court develop a reputation as a high-quality international legal
institution.
196.
For example, a state seeking to prosecute an ICC defendant as part of a
concerted strategy of post-conflict reconciliation might be entitled to comparatively
more leeway with respect to international due process norms.
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important predictive question: given all the institutional forces at
work, what is the most likely way that actors within the ICC will
resolve the key doctrinal problems? Second, this Article has
endeavored to show that the ICC has much to gain by reaching across
jurisdictional and doctrinal lines and learning from other legal
systems-both in the context of complementarity and beyond. The
project of international criminal courts is so unique in the history of
international law and criminal justice that one can be tempted to
view these courts as singular, articulating a new jurisprudence from
the four corners of their governing statutes. But, particularly in areas
like complementarity that are not strictly tied to international
criminal law, the ICC stands to benefit greatly from engaging with
the broader "community of courts,"19 7 attempting to resolve analogous
issues. In the complementarity context at least, the result likely
would be a stronger, more sustainable doctrine.

197.
I borrow this term from Anne-Marie Slaughter, A Global Community of
Courts, 44 HARV. INT'L L.J. 191 (2003).

